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SAVING THE PRESS CLAUSE FROM RUIN:  
THE CUSTOMARY ORIGINS OF A “FREE PRESS” AS INTERFACE TO 
THE PRESENT AND FUTURE 
 
Patrick J. Charles* & Kevin Francis O’Neill** 
 
Abstract 
 
Based on a close reading of original sources dating back to 
America’s early colonial period, this Article offers a fresh look at the 
origins of the Press Clause. Then, applying those historical findings, the 
Article critiques recent scholarship in the field and reassesses the 
Supreme Court’s Press Clause jurisprudence. Finally, the Article 
describes the likely impact of its historical findings if the Court ever 
employed them in interpreting the Press Clause. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On February 18, 1789, Massachusetts Chief Justice William Cushing wrote to 
John Adams a detailed letter concerning the “liberty of the press.”1 In particular, 
Cushing had questions regarding Article XVI of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, which reads, “The liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom 
in a state: it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this Commonwealth.”2 He 
wondered whether a libel directed against officeholders could be punishable under 
                                                          
* © 2012 Patrick J. Charles. Mr. Charles received his J.D. from Cleveland-Marshall 
College of Law, and his B.A. in History and International Affairs from the George 
Washington University. He is a historian for the United States Air Force Special 
Operations Command 352nd Special Operations Group stationed at Mildenhall, United 
Kingdom. The contents of this Article are not those of the United States Air Force or the 
Department of Defense, and solely the author’s. The author would like to thank Cindi 
McDonald and Trista R. Adams for providing assistance with gathering source material. 
The author is particularly thankful to his former professor and coauthor Kevin Francis 
O’Neill for his contribution to this Article. This Article is dedicated to the family and 
friends that were there when needed during the past year. 
** © 2012 Kevin Francis O’Neill. Associate Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College 
of Law, Cleveland State University. I can claim no credit for the extensive historical 
research that forms the heart of this Article; all of that research was performed by my co-
author, Patrick J. Charles. My contribution to this paper is much more modest. It is largely 
confined to Parts VI and VII—a critique of the Supreme Court’s Press Clause 
jurisprudence, viewed in light of the historical findings exhumed by Patrick J. Charles. 
1 Original Draft of Letter from William Cushing, Chief Justice, to John Adams  
(Feb. 18, 1789), in MASS. L.Q., Oct. 1942, at 12, 12 [hereinafter Letter from  
Chief Justice Cushing]. 
2 MASS. CONST. art. XVI (annulled 1948). 
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the clause if “such charges are supportable by the truth of fact.”3 Cushing further 
elaborated on the liberty of the press in legal terms, writing: 
 
But the words of our article understood according to plain English, 
make no such distinction, and must exclude subsequent restraints, as 
much as previous restraints . . . . 
The question upon the article is this—What is the liberty of the 
press, which is essential to the security of freedom? The propagating 
literature and knowledge by printing or otherwise tends to illuminate 
men’s minds and to establish them in principles of freedom. But it cannot 
be denied also, that a free scanning of the conduct of the administration 
and shewing the tendency of it, and where truth will warrant, making it 
manifest that it is subversive of all law, liberty, and the Constitution; it 
can’t be denied. I think that the liberty tends to the security of freedom in 
a State; even more directly and essentially than the liberty of printing 
upon literary and speculative subjects in general. Without this liberty of 
the press could we have supported our liberties against British 
administration? or could our revolution have taken place? Pretty 
certainly it could not, at the time it did. Under a sense of impression of 
this sort, I conceive, this article was adopted. This liberty of publishing 
truth can never effectually injure a good government, or honest 
administrators; but it may save a state from the necessity of a revolution, 
as well as bring one about, when it is necessary . . . . 
But this liberty of the press having truth for its basis who can stand 
before it? Besides it may facilitate a legal prosecution, which might not, 
otherwise, have been dared to be attempted. When the press is made the 
vehicle of falsehood and scandal, let the authors be punished with 
becoming rigour. 
But why need any honest man be afraid of truth? The guilty only 
fear it; and I am inclined to think with Gordon (Vol. 3 No. 20 of Cato’s 
Letters) that truth scarcely adhered to, can never upon the whole 
prejudice, right religion, equal government or a government founded 
upon proper balances and checks, or the happiness of society in any 
respect, but must be favorable to them all. 
Suppressing this liberty by penal laws will it not more endanger 
freedom than do good to government? The weight of government is 
sufficient to prevent any very dangerous consequences occasioned by 
provocations resulting from charges founded in truth; whether such 
charges are made in a legal course or otherwise. In either case, the 
provocation (which Judge Blackstone says is the sole foundation of the 
law against libels) being much the same. 
                                                          
3 Letter from Chief Justice Cushing, supra note 1, at 12. 
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But not to trouble you with a multiplying of words; If I am wrong I 
should be glad to be set right, &c., &c.4 
 
Cushing’s letter highlights many important aspects of the liberty of the press 
in late eighteenth-century America. First, it incorporates treatises such as William 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, and Cato’s Letters. Certainly, the practice of 
incorporating available legal treatises into constitutional analysis was quite 
common among the founding generation.5 A close reading of Cushing’s letter, 
however, reveals other intellectual influences that coincidently matriculated 
through a free press. It confirms the importance of contemporaneous books, 
pamphlets, and newspaper editorials when conducting any legal history, especially 
a constitutional provision’s intellectual origins. 
Second, Cushing’s remembrance of the American Revolution highlights the 
significant event that shaped the liberty of the press.6 Just as actual events would 
affect the adoption, text, and structure of the Declaration of Independence,7 so too 
did they affect the founding generation’s view on constitutional doctrine.8 Thus, 
the importance of social history when analyzing the Constitution is evident, 
especially the all-important fact that the members of the founding generation were 
well attuned to the causes and struggles for their independence.9 
                                                          
4 Id. at 14–15. 
5 See generally Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late 
Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 189 (1984) 
(discussing how European writers had an influence on American political thought between 
1760 and 1805). 
6 Interpreting the Constitution through the events of the American Revolution is rare 
among legal scholars, but is crucial to understanding the evolution of eighteenth-century 
political and constitutional thought. See generally JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2011). Take for instance prominent “historical” 
research on the First Amendment’s Free Press Clause by leading First Amendment law 
professors. David A. Anderson and Eugene Volokh both focus on the events 
contemporaneous with the Constitution or following it, yet ignore the liberty of the press as 
an evolving intellectual, political, and constitutional right. See David A. Anderson, The 
Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983) (providing only a glimpse of the 
“liberty of the press” prior to the Constitution); Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as 
an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 459 (2011) (starting the historical inquiry with 1791 and ignoring any revolutionary or 
prerevolutionary doctrine). 
7 See generally PATRICK J. CHARLES, IRRECONCILABLE GRIEVANCES: THE EVENTS 
THAT SHAPED THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (2008); PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN 
SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 105–23 (1997). 
8 See Patrick J. Charles, Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” in 
Our Constitutional Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Legal History, 20 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 457, 477–512 (2011). 
9 For an interesting eighteenth-century oration on this point, see ELIJAH WATERMAN, 
AN ORATION, DELIVERED BEFORE THE SOCIETY OF CINCINNATI, HARTFORD, JULY 4, 1794, 
at 16 (Hartford, Hudson & Goodwin 1794) (“AMERICANS should ever watch the causes 
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Third, and perhaps most importantly, Cushing embraced the liberty of the 
press as an entity that facilitates the voice of the people, which “directly and 
essentially” contributes to the “security of freedom in a State.”10 He made sure to 
distinguish between reporting on the “conduct of the administration and shewing 
the tendency of it” and the “liberty of printing upon literary and speculative 
subjects in general.”11 Even John Adams’s reply to Cushing conveys a larger 
constitutional purpose for the press: 
 
Our chief magistrates and Senators &c are annually eligible by the 
people. How are their characters and conduct to be known to their 
constituents but by the press? If the press is stopped and the people  
kept in Ignorance we had much better have the first magistrates and  
Senators hereditary.12 
 
What this exchange illuminates is that the founding generation saw the liberty 
of the press as a crucial instrument to the success of the American Republic. They 
viewed it not merely as an extension of free speech or a right to publish through 
the invention of printing.13 A free press meant much more. It was often referred to 
as the palladium or bulwark of liberty, toasted at constitutional celebrations, 
included in most of the state constitutions prior to the adoption of the federal 
Constitution,14 and could afford distinct protections to printers. In 1755, one 
                                                          
which produced their revolution, which produced the [D]eclaration of [I]ndependence. That 
this truth may be practically inculcated upon their minds—to preserve their rights and 
liberties, they must tenaciously adhere to the same principles, by which they were 
originated and perfected. Whatever has been the foundation of their independence, must 
still be preserved as the permanent basis of their security and future happiness. The mind, 
when it reflects that former nations have uniformly travelled in the road to ruin, is anxious 
to know, if there is not some way through which we may walk in safety, and continue our 
existence as a happy people till the time shall be no longer.”). 
10 Letter from Chief Justice Cushing, supra note 1, at 14. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 16. 
13 See generally Volokh, supra note 6 (discussing how people of the framing era 
interpreted the right of freedom of the press as a general right). 
14 See GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXI (“Freedom of the press and trial by jury to remain 
inviolate forever.”); MD. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, § XXXVIII (“That the 
liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved.”); PENN. CONST. of 1776, declaration 
of rights, § XII (“That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing, and 
publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to be restrained.”); 
N.C. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, § XV (“That the freedom of the press is one of 
the great bulwarks of liberty, and therefore ought never to be restrained.”); VT. CONST. of 
1777, declaration of rights, art. XIV (“That the people have a right to freedom of speech, 
and of writing and publishing their sentiments; therefore, the freedom of the press ought 
not be restrained.”); S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XLIII (“That the liberty of the press be 
inviolably preserved.”); MASS. CONST. art. XVI (annulled 1948) (“The liberty of the press 
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anonymous commentator even likened the liberty of the press to the “ringing of the 
Alarm-Bell,” for it was the constitutional vehicle by which “Truths of the highest 
Importance” are divulged.15 
Naturally, the constitutional significance of the liberty of the press, freedom 
of the press, or a free press did not originate in 1791, 1787, or 1776. It developed 
much earlier, through intellectual discourse and customary practice. Prior to the 
American Revolution, the liberty of the press was never codified in any colonial 
charter, the English Bill of Rights, or even a statute. It is truly one of the first 
customary rights; indeed, customary practice influenced the tenets of a free press, 
and a free press was viewed as crucial to the success of a democratic government. 
Despite these historical facts, the Supreme Court has never recognized the free 
press as a distinct and separate constitutional entity.16 Instead, the Court’s free 
speech jurisprudence has engulfed any constitutional protections afforded to it.17 
Whether such muddling of First Amendment jurisprudence is consistent with 
the founding generation’s intent has been the subject of debate since the mid-
twentieth century.18 The debate centers on whether a free press affords journalists 
                                                          
is essential to the security of freedom in a state; it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in 
this commonwealth.”); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXII (amended 1968) (“The Liberty of the 
Press is essential to the security of freedom in a state; it ought, therefore, to be inviolably 
preserved.”); VA. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, § XII (“That the freedom of the 
press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty and can never be restrained but by  
despotic governments.”). 
15 AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 16, 17 (London, J. Raymond 1755). 
16 The Supreme Court opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), expounds this point. Justice Scalia thought it “strange to interpret 
the phrase ‘the freedom of speech, or of the press’ to mean, not everyone’s right to speak or 
publish, but rather everyone’s right to speak or the institutional press’s right to publish.” Id. 
at 928 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring). Meanwhile, Justice Stevens viewed the text and history 
of the Constitution as suggesting “why one type of corporation, those that are part of the 
press, might be able to claim special First Amendment status.” Id. at 951 n.57 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Of course, the Supreme Court is not bound to 
follow past precedent if the historical record proves otherwise. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. 
v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779, 788 (1995); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 575 (1993); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 
458–59 (1983); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665–66 (1944); see also Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399–400 (1821) (discussing the importance of weighing each 
constitutional question before the Court with care). 
17 For some prominent examples, see Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 US. 
539, 559 (1976); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964); Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 618–19 (1919). 
See also infra Part VI. 
18 For the first historical controversy concerning the Press Clause, compare 
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941), with LEONARD W. 
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN 
HISTORY (1960). See also Vikram David Amar, From Watergate to Ken Starr: Potter 
Stewart’s “Or of the Press” A Quarter Century Later, 50 Hastings L.J. 711, 713–14 (1999) 
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and press entities any distinct First Amendment protections above and beyond or 
separate from those of the general people. Even today, First Amendment scholars 
still debate this question, and two in particular stand out as continuing this half-
century debate—Professors Sonja R. West and Eugene Volokh. Sonja R. West 
believes to ignore any distinct free press protections is to make the First 
Amendment a “constitutional redundancy.”19 West finds it baffling that the 
Supreme Court “occasionally offers up rhetoric on the value of a free press,” yet 
“steadfastly refuses to explicitly recognize any right or protection as emanating 
solely from the Press Clause.”20 In a nutshell, West’s argument for the recognition 
of press protections is twofold. First, the text of the Constitution prescribes that the 
Supreme Court divides First Amendment protections into distinct speech and press 
categories.21 Second, West finds it “unsatisfying to have a Press Clause that is 
powerless to protect reporters who, as members of the press, endeavor to inform 
the public and to check the government.”22 
West’s baseline arguments are nothing new in the pantheon of legal 
scholarship. Writing thirty-six years earlier, Justice Potter Stewart provided similar 
arguments in his article Or of the Press.23 Stewart, too, addressed the 
“constitutional redundancy” of jurisprudentially combining the Speech and Press 
Clauses, concluding that the “publishing business is . . . the only organized private 
business that is given explicit constitutional protection.”24 In making this argument 
Stewart provided only miniscule historical support.25 Meanwhile, West does not 
even attempt to reconcile her conclusions with the historical record.26 This does not 
mean, however, that West is wrong to assert any unique free press protections. As 
this Article will convey, a detailed look at the historical record and customary 
origins of the Press Clause actually supports West’s baseline arguments. 
In contrast to West’s position, Eugene Volokh asserts the Press Clause was 
“likely understood . . . as fitting the press-as-technology model.”27 This model 
secures the “right of every person to use communications technology” and is not 
                                                          
(asserting the founding generation intended the Speech Clause and Press Clause to 
encompass the same constitutional protections); Anderson, supra note 6, at 534 (“That the 
press clause has a distinct history does not mean, of course, that it must be given a meaning 
different from the speech clause today, or even that it had a different meaning in 1791.”). 
19 Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025,  
1027–28 (2011). 
20 Id. at 1028. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 1028–29. 
23 Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975). 
24 Id. at 633. 
25 Id. at 633–34. 
26 See West, supra note 19, at 1033–41 (arguing based solely on the textual structure 
of the Constitution). 
27 Volokh, supra note 6, at 463. Volokh is not the first to assert this technology 
argument. See Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 309, 312, 330–56 
(2008) (discussing the Framers’ understanding of “the press” to mean printing technology). 
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limited “to members of the publishing industry.”28 Volokh supports this 
interpretation with minor references to the historical record. The methodology 
Volokh employs, however, is not historical, even in the most basic sense. It is a 
regurgitation of New Originalism and textualism, for it ignores the social, 
intellectual, and customary origins of a free press and focuses intently on modern 
perceptions of eighteenth-century commentary. This is not to say that Volokh’s 
thesis is without any merit. A more complete examination of the historical record 
provides circumstantial support for the view that a free press must protect certain 
technologies through which the people may write their sentiments. To properly 
assert such a claim, though, one must employ proper historical methodologies. It is 
not enough to merely infer a history with the use of ad hoc history and  
textual wordplay. 
This Article sets forth to reconcile these divergent views through the use of 
history. Both Volokh and West employ methodologies that arguably endanger the 
rich history of a free press. If the Supreme Court is to ever truly acknowledge any 
separate and distinct press protections, it will require a proper understanding of the 
intellectual origins and history of a free press. It is not enough to debate the textual 
structure of the First Amendment, decipher a handful of historical documents, 
debate the meaning of those words, and incorporate eighteenth-century dictionaries 
to fill the legal interpretational gap. Conducting a complete social and intellectual 
inquiry requires employing proper historical methodologies and assembling the 
whole responsibly. Only then may the courts maintain their civic duty of historical 
consciousness29 and use history as a guidepost to adjudicating cases  
and controversies.30 
Before delving into the history of a free press, Part I of this Article briefly 
addresses the methodological problems employed by West’s and Volokh’s 
scholarship. Indeed, the historical findings in this Article support both scholars’ 
theses, but the methodologies West and Volokh employ may prove disastrous to 
preserving the historical record of the Press Clause. Part II then discusses the 
Anglo intellectual origins of the Press Clause. Part III addresses the development 
                                                          
28 Volokh, supra note 6, at 463. 
29 In the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
 
In order to know what [the law] is, we must know what it has been, and 
what it tends to become. We must alternately consult history and existing 
theories of legislation. But the most difficult labor will be to understand the 
combination of the two into new products at every stage. 
 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown & Co. 1944) (1881). 
30 Historical guideposts require an honest use of history when adjudicating legal 
issues. For more on the use of historical guideposts, see Patrick J. Charles, The Second 
Amendment Standard of Review After McDonald: “Historical Guideposts” and the Missing 
Arguments in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 7,  
8–39 (2010). 
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of a free press in the American colonies prior to the American Revolution. Part IV 
then addresses the constitutional utility of a free press from the American 
Revolution through the pre-Constitution years. Part V addresses what the Press 
Clause meant at the time the Constitution was created. Lastly, Part VI weighs this 
history against current Supreme Court precedent and discusses what this history 
can provide jurists as a matter of constitutional jurisprudence. It serves to question 
whether the recognition of distinct free press protections should develop based on 
the customary origins of the Press Clause. 
 
I.  CASTING OFF OUR ANGLO-AMERICAN ORIGINS?: 
THE IMPROPRIETY OF DISCARDING THE HISTORY OF A FREE PRESS 
 
In the wake of the New Originalism outcome in District of Columbia v. 
Heller,31 legal academia continues to shift away from accepted historical 
methodologies and substitute originalist and textualist methodologies.32 It is 
unclear why this shift is occurring except to provide an easy method for legal 
scholars to support their respective interpretations of constitutional text and create 
a constitutional framework that never existed except in the minds of the modern 
theorists writing it.33 In a recent article, Barry Friedman wrote that as long as 
accepted historical methodologies “have reasons that support them,” legal scholars 
                                                          
31 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
32 The role of historian is to not suggest a “causal relation,” but to show that events 
and ideas are intimately connected. See Quentin Skinner, The Limits of Historical 
Explanations, 41 PHILOSOPHY 199, 202 (1966); see also id. at 209 (“To see historical 
relationships in terms of repeated patterns of thought or action is to imply not merely that 
thinking or acting are uniformly purposive, but that they do characteristically result in 
patterns. There is thus a very strong predisposition, particularly evident in histories of 
thought, to ignore the difficulties about proper emphasis and tone which must arise in 
making any sort of paraphrase of a work, and to assume instead that its author must have 
had some doctrine, or a ‘message’, which can be readily abstracted and more simply put.”). 
33 This is contrary to accepted historical methodologies. The goal of any historical 
inquiry is to understand the past for the sake of the past. See H. BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG 
INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 16 (1931) (“[When a historian is engaged upon a piece of 
research] he comes to his labours conscious of the fact that he is trying to understand the 
past for the sake of the past, and though it is true that he can never entirely abstract himself 
from his own age, it is none the less certain that this consciousness of his purpose is a very 
different one from that of the whig historian, who tells himself that he is studying the past 
for the sake of the present. Real historical understanding is not achieved by the 
subordination of the past to the present, but rather by our making the past our present and 
attempting to see life with the eyes of another century than our own.”); see also J.G.A. 
POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 7 
(1971); J.G.A. Pocock, The Origins of Study of the Past: A Comparative Approach, 4 
COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 209, 211–14 (1962) (discussing the importance of a historian’s 
“social awareness” of the past before one can ever relate history to the present). 
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should adhere to those methodologies.34 In other words, legal scholars should 
adhere to reasonable historical “standards regarding how they search, what claims 
they make, on what evidence, and to what end.”35 Although Friedman is not a 
historian, he understands it is common sense for legal scholars to employ each 
discipline’s methodological norms, especially those of historians. 
Herein rests an ongoing problem with many of today’s self-proclaimed legal 
histories. Legal academia continuously churns out so-called history without having 
a firm grasp on the proper methodologies.36 This includes the most basic 
methodologies such as reading the prominent historical works on the subject, 
balancing divergent views, and removing modern biases.37 These so-called legal 
histories focus on the modern meaning of constitutional or statutory text, often 
with little understanding of eighteenth-century political thought.38 Their 
interpretive methods come in all forms, including popular sovereignty, public 
meaning, original meaning, and textualism. Each method has its benefits in 
                                                          
34 Barry Friedman, Discipline and Method: The Making of The Will of the People, 
2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877, 891. 
35 Id. 
36 For four great articles discussing the problems with the legal academy’s approach 
to history, see J.G.A. Pocock, Virtues, Rights, and Manners: A Model for Historians of 
Political Thought, 9 POL. THEORY 353, 362–64 (1981); Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Clio at the 
Bar: A Guide to Historical Method for Legists and Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REV. 377 (1998); 
Erin Rahne Kidwell, The Paths of the Law: Historical Consciousness, Creative 
Democracy, and Judicial Review, 62 ALB. L. REV. 91 (1998); Saul Cornell, Heller, New 
Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2009). 
37 The goal of the historical inquiry is “total historical context.” See Skinner, supra 
note 32, at 202–04, 214; see also J.G.A. Pocock et al., The History of British Political 
Thought: A Field and Its Futures, in BRITISH POLITICAL THOUGHT IN HISTORY, 
LITERATURE AND THEORY, 1500–1800, at 10, 11 (David Armitage ed., 2006) (“The 
historian is interested in what the author meant to say, succeeded in saying, and was 
understood to have said, in a succession of historical contexts now distant in time.”); 
Quentin Skinner, Hermeneutics and the Role of History, 7 NEW LITERARY HIST. 209, 216–
17 (1975) (prescribing three rules for intellectual historical context). 
38 This improper approach was applied in the case of the Second Amendment. 
Numerous legal academics recast the right to “keep and bear arms” to effectuate a “well-
regulated militia” as merely having arms in their hands. See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT 
EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 85, 144 (Indep. 
Inst. 1994) (1984); Nelson Lund, D.C.’s Handgun Ban and the Constitutional Right to 
Arms: One Hard Question?, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 229, 246–47 (2008); David T. 
Hardy, Ducking the Bullet: District of Columbia v. Heller and the Stevens Dissent, 2010 
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 61, 67 n.32, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/Joomla1.5/ 
content/denovo/HARDY_2010_61.pdf. The founding generation, however, understood 
such an armed people to be nothing more than a dangerous mob and in no way resembled 
the constitutional entity of a “well-regulated militia.” See generally Patrick J. Charles, The 
Constitutional Significance of a Well-Regulated Militia Asserted and Proven with 
Commentary on the Future of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 3 NE. U. L.J. 1 (2011). 
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providing answers to questions that often the historical record cannot provide. 
These methods are no substitute, however, for the accepted methodologies 
employed in the fields of intellectual and social history. While not always perfect, 
and as this Article will show, historical methodologies provide us the best means 
to trace the origin of political and constitutional thought from its inception through 
any changes and developments. 
Take for instance Volokh’s historical claim that the founding generation 
“likely understood” the Press Clause as codifying “the press-as-technology 
model.”39 Volokh comes to this conclusion without ever examining the Anglo 
origins of the right or its intellectual development prior to the ratification of the 
Constitution. To his credit, Volokh does pay lip service to the treatises of William 
Blackstone and Jean-Louis De Lolme,40 yet ignores the evolution of eighteenth-
century political thought, particularly in the constraints of Anglo-American 
constitutionalism as a whole. Suffice it to say the Constitution did not completely 
revolutionize eighteenth-century constitutional jurisprudence, nor did it cast off our 
Anglo origins to start the world anew.41 
Under the guise of originalism, many self-proclaimed legal histories assert a 
different approach. They focus intently on the text of the 1787–1791 constitutional 
debates and the years immediately following.42 While this may seem like a fair 
way to deduce original or public meaning of a constitutional provision, it fails to 
consider the intellectual origins of the text at issue and that text’s evolution. For 
instance, are we really to believe that everyone viewed the Press Clause as solely 
the extension of free speech and being primarily influenced by the works of 
William Blackstone and a few others? The answer is no, because to understand 
eighteenth-century American constitutionalism is to trace the evolution of political 
and legal thought from its Anglo origins through its development in the American 
Revolution, the Articles of Confederation, the ratification of the Constitution, and 
its subsequent application in legal thought. Any other methodical formulation is a 
dangerous and ad hoc approach to history. 
                                                          
39 Volokh, supra note 6, at 463. 
40 Id. at 465–66. 
41 See generally GREENE, supra note 6 (discussing the development of American 
political thought in accordance with the British Constitution); Patrick J. Charles, The 
Plenary Power Doctrine and the Constitutionality of Ideological Exclusion: An Historical 
Perspective, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 61 (2010) (discussing the continuance of the Anglo 
doctrine of allegiance and international plenary power doctrine in American constitutional 
thought); Patrick J. Charles, Scribble Scrabble, the Second Amendment, and Historical 
Guideposts: A Short Reply to Lawrence Rosenthal and Joyce Lee Malcolm, 105 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 227 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/ 
6/LRColl2011n6Charles.pdf (discussing the unquestioned continuance of English gun 
control statutes). 
42 In terms of the Press Clause, see Anderson, supra note 6, at 487 (“[A]ttempts to 
divine the ‘original understanding’ of the press clause must begin with this sketchy history 
of its framing.”). 
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What is the harm in historically untrained jurists relying solely on an 
originalist or textualist approach, especially if the conclusion has some merit? The 
primary answer is it can give false impressions about the protective scope of 
constitutional provisions. As Parts III through V will show, Eugene Volokh’s 
press-as-technology thesis has some historical merit, but not because of the 
methodology he employs. The technological vehicle of printing books, pamphlets, 
and newspapers remained unchanged from the late seventeenth century through the 
early Republic. This historical fact alone derails Volokh’s approach to 
understanding the founding era. With only one publishing technology available 
circa 1791, it is impossible to ascertain how the founding generation viewed the 
Press Clause as an evolving technological right of the people to employ free 
speech. Are we to believe the founding generation had the foresight to predict 
other popular publishing mediums such as radio, television, and the Internet? The 
answer remains no. 
While Volokh’s textual interpretations are imprecise at best, this does not 
mean his entire thesis is without historical support. The founding generation may 
not have possessed the foresight for the development of new press technologies, 
but they understood that the rights a free press protects were customary in nature 
and evolved with society. The founding generation traced the liberty of the press, 
freedom of the press, and a free press from the events of the 1689 Glorious 
Revolution, and sometimes as far back as Greek and Roman times.43 In other 
words, the protective scope of a free press did not develop overnight or in a span of 
a few years. It was the result of decades of debate in the public discourse. These 
origins reveal the framers’ foresight to evolve constitutional doctrine based upon 
customary practice. In particular, the founders inform us of the importance of a 
free press in terms of utility. 
Contrary to the methodological approach Professor David A. Anderson 
employs, the historical inquiry into the freedom of the press should not begin with 
the “sketchy history of its framing” in the federal Constitution.44 Understanding the 
intellectual origins and protective scope of constitutional provisions works the 
other way around. It is not enough to simply play hypothetical word scenarios.45 
For instance, the fact that eighteenth-century commentators frequently referred to 
the freedom of the press as the right of every “freeman,” “citizen,” or “individual” 
                                                          
43 See infra text accompanying notes 182–183. 
44 Anderson, supra note 6, at 487. 
45 POCOCK, supra note 33, at 7 (“The non-historical practitioner is not concerned with 
what the author of the statement made in a remote past meant by it so much as with what 
he in his present can make it mean.”). Such explaining away the historical record is 
inconsistent with accepted historical methodologies. See BUTTERFIELD, supra note 33, at 
100–02; WILLIAM KELLEHER STOREY, WRITING HISTORY: A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS 44 
(1999) (“Real historical writers probe factual uncertainties but they do not invent 
convenient facts and they do not ignore inconvenient facts. People are entitled to their own 
opinions, but not to their own facts.”). 
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does not solely lead to a press-as-technology conclusion.46 The fact remains that 
there was the intermediate step of obtaining the permission of the printer or editor 
before any writing became published.47 In contrast, Volokh finds any interpretation 
incorporating this step as an “odd understanding” of the freedom of the press.48 
Just because it is “odd” to Volokh, and perhaps others, does not wash away a 
century of intellectual and social history. The constitutional significance of a free 
press, as an entity, must be reconciled in the constraints of historical context, not 
simply brushed away as difficult to understand.49 
Volokh is not alone in deducing meaning from text and structure. His 
intellectual counterpart, Sonja R. West, seeks solace in a similar approach, albeit in 
a different form. West invokes arguments on the founding generation’s use of 
commas, distinctive conjunctions, and even semicolons to conclude that the 
Constitution’s Speech and Press Clauses are to be “logically read as related in 
nature but properly assigned different tasks.”50 Other than this brief incorporation 
of eighteenth-century constitutionalism, West avoids the historical record, for she 
believes the “historical evidence . . . is, at best, conflicting.”51 In history’s place, 
West argues that the Press Clause should offer “protections only for information 
gathering.”52 West supports this definition because it would provide us with a 
“dynamic” Press Clause that ensures numerous journalistic protections.53 
West’s ahistorical approach to providing modern day journalistic protections 
is not without merit. Although she divorces the Press Clause from its historical 
pedigree, the customary origins and constitutional significance of a free press 
provide a historical vehicle by which distinct journalistic rights can be recognized. 
Naturally, before identifying any customary protections afforded to a free press, 
the historical origins and significance of the press must be explored. 
 
II.  THE ANGLO ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A FREE PRESS  
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
When legal commentators speak of the Anglo-American origins of a free 
press they often refer to the popular works of William Blackstone, Jean-Louis De 
Lolme, Thomas Gordon, and John Trenchard. Certainly these works were 
                                                          
46 See Volokh, supra note 6, at 465–71. 
47 A virtuous eighteenth-century printer did not publish anything and everything. 
There were professional guidelines that were expected to be followed. Even writers of 
editorials requested the printer’s permission under the liberty of the press. See infra notes 
250–251 and accompanying text for a discussion on these facets of eighteenth-century  
print culture. 
48 Volokh, supra note 6, at 470. 
49 Id. at 470–74. 
50 West, supra note 19, at 1034. 
51 Id. at 1040. 
52 Id. at 1057. 
53 Id. at 1043–44. 
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influential among the founding generation. To focus solely on these works, 
however, is to do a historical injustice to the origins of a free press, for such late- 
to mid-eighteenth-century views did not develop out of thin air. Blackstone, De 
Lolme, Gordon, and Trenchard unquestionably borrowed their views from other 
sources, which asserted that the events of the Glorious Revolution confirmed the 
necessity for press liberties.54 
Unlike most Anglo-American rights, the development of a free press stems 
from customary practice.55 It had not been statutorily codified in the Magna Carta, 
1689 English Bill of Rights, or even the 1701 Act of Settlement. Instead, its origins 
developed from the bowels of the print culture itself.56 Press advocates asserted the 
need for press liberties as a vehicle for political and religious dialogue, to spread 
knowledge and virtue, provide a check on tyrannical government, and even to 
prevent licentiousness and libel.57 There were even cogent arguments against 
taxing the press, licensing, and any prior restraint.58 At the same time, there were 
counter arguments asserting the need for a return to licensing and some prior 
restraints.59 Needless to say a constitutional right to a free press was a hot topic in 
the popular print culture, yet slow to develop in terms of jurisprudence. 
It was not until 1770 that an English jury was charged with the instruction that 
there was, in fact, a “liberty of the press.”60 The case was Rex v. Woodfall,61 in 
which Lord Mansfield delivered the following charge to the grand jury: 
 
As for the liberty of the press, . . . I will tell you what that is; the liberty 
of the press is, that a man may print what he pleases without a licenser: 
as long as it remains so, the liberty of the press is not restrained. It is  
the same as in all other actions a man may use his arm; but he must  
not strike his neighbour: a man may use his tongue, but he must not  
speak blasphemy.62 
 
                                                          
54 For a history of the press and the Glorious Revolution, see Lois G. Schwoerer, 
Press and Parliament in the Revolution of 1689, 20 THE HISTORICAL JOURNAL 545 (1977). 
55 See Douglas M. Ford, The Growth of the Freedom of the Press, 4 THE ENGLISH 
HISTORICAL REVIEW 1 (1889); Edward A. Bloom, Neoclassic “Paper Wars” for a Free 
Press, 56 MOD. LANGUAGE REV. 481 (1961); FREDERICK S. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476–1776, at 346–92 (1965). 
56 See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 89–118 (Oxford University 
Press, New York 1965) (discussing the development of the liberty for the press from 
Milton to Cato). 
57 See id. at 104. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. at 89–118. 
60 Rex v. Woodfall, (1770) 20 Howell’s State Trials 895, 897–903. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 903. 
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Although Mansfield acknowledged the existence of the liberty of the press, 
the actual court opinion did not weigh its interests.63 This does not disparage the 
fact that the liberty of the press was identified as a constitutional right. Its 
recognition in the pantheon of constitutional jurisprudence can be solely attributed 
to custom, but Mansfield was not the first justice to identify the right in the English 
Empire. In 1749, Thomas Marlay, the Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in 
Ireland, charged a Dublin grand jury on the issue of libels. Marlay reminded the 
jury of its duty to “present all seditious Libels, the Authors, Printers, and malicious 
Publishers of them, in your several Counties.”64 As for the nature of libels, Marlay 
proceeded as follows: 
 
A LIBEL is a malicious Defamation of any Person dead or living, 
express’d by Writing, Printing, or Picture, and is most severely punish’d 
by the Law, because of the direct Tendency to the Breach of the Peace. 
THIS was always a dangerous Offence; but is more so, since the 
Invention of Printing, and since Printing-Presses have been so common. 
And let me observe to you, Gentlemen, That nothing can preserve the 
Liberty of the Press, but an effectual Restraint on the Licentiousness  
of Printing.65 
 
Marlay queried, “DOES not [a libel] tend to the Subversion of all Morality, 
the very Tie and Bond of Human Society?”66 His point being that the liberty of the 
press does not extend to vilifying the very government that protects said liberty. It 
was unlawful to direct publications towards the subversion of government. If this 
were otherwise, Marlay wrote, “Force and Violence must prevail, and Mankind 
must live in the Condition of Beasts of Prey.”67 
Fourteen years later, Richard Aston, the Chief Justice of the Court of 
Common Pleas, delivered similar sentiments to a Dublin grand jury. Aston viewed 
libels as “a gross Abuse of the Liberty of the Press, as it perverts that valuable 
Privilege in Favour of Public Liberties, into a mischievous Attack on the 
Happiness of private Persons.”68 Aston did not view liberty of the press as a free 
license to print on any topic. Instead, it was subject to the “Law of Reason”: 
 
[Libel] is therefore deemed an Indictable Offence; for the Liberty of the 
Press, is, like all other Liberties, to be used and enjoyed according to 
Law, which being a Law of Reason, and guarding against Force, 
Violence and Licentiousness in every Branch of it, will no more admit an 
                                                          
63 See id. at 917–21. 
64 CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY 1689–1803, at 349 (Georges Lamoine ed., 1992). 
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67 Id. at 350. 
68 Id. at 402. 
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injurious Insult on a Man’s Reputation than a forcible one on his Person 
or Property.69 
 
Thus, as a matter of mid-eighteenth-century legal custom, the liberty of the 
press was seen as a fairly limited privilege. Other than the doctrine against prior 
restraint, the judiciary did not see any other protections afforded to the press. This 
included the power to impose laws concerning seditious libel and to prevent a 
breach of the peace.70 In the words of William Mainwaring: 
 
The Liberty of the Press is one of the glorious Privileges of 
Englishmen—it is essential to the Liberty of the Subject, to the Existence 
of a free State, while exercised for lawful and just Purposes; but when it 
is made use of as the Instrument of Slander and Detraction, to destroy the 
Comfort and Happiness of Individuals, or to disturb the Harmony and 
good Order of the State . . . it becomes the most mischievous and 
destructive Engine that can be put into the Hands of wicked and ill-
designing Men.71 
 
The liberty of the press as a popular right, however, was seen as protecting 
much more than prior restraint during the late-seventeenth to mid-eighteenth 
century. To cover each and every political tract from this period would be 
impossible. Thus, this Article will focus on some of the more notable publications 
to convey the divergent views of the era. One prevalent late eighteenth-century 
tract is John Toland’s A Letter to a Member of Parliament. Toland opposed “the 
Restraining of the Press, as inconsistent with the Protestant Religion, and 
dangerous to the Liberties of the Nation.”72 It was “Mens mutual Duty” to educate 
each other on all matters, including any matters that may be inconsistent with  
the church.73 
Toland’s argument was laid out simply in terms of “Truth and Falsehood.”74 
He believed any restraint on the press deprived “Men of the most proper and best 
means to discover Truth,” and hindered them from “seeing and examining the 
different Opinions, and the Arguments alledg’d for them.”75 Concerning the belief 
that licensing prevents “fallacious Arguments and specious Pretences,” Toland 
responded as follows: 
                                                          
69 Id. 
70 See id. at 105, 204, 220, 236–37, 262, 276, 291–92, 296, 299, 303, 306–07, 309, 
313, 340, 342, 349, 360, 369, 374, 382, 395. 
71 Id. at 452. 
72 JOHN TOLAND, A LETTER TO A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, SHEWING, THAT A 
RESTRAINT ON THE PRESS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROTESTANT RELIGION, AND 
DANGEROUS TO THE LIBERTIES OF THE NATION 3 (London, F. Darby 1698). 
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74 Id. at 3–4. 
75 Id. at 5. 
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[T]he more apt Men are to mistake and to be deceiv’d [by false 
arguments], the less reason there is for their relying on any one Party, but 
the more to examine with all care and diligence the Reasons on all sides, 
and consequently for the Press being open to all Parties, one as well as 
the other. So that those that are for allowing Men the liberty of judging 
for themselves . . . are very unhappy in their Arguments, because they  
all make against themselves, and out of their own Mouths they  
are condemned.76 
 
Another way to articulate Toland’s viewpoint is to characterize the liberty of 
the press as a pendulum of truth. Whenever the pendulum would swing one way 
with an argument, the counter viewpoint would swing it to the other side. This 
allowed the discovery of knowledge to perpetuate and facilitate a balance between 
truth and falsehood. In other words, a true liberty of the press was continuously 
self-correcting until the truth was illuminated. Toland viewed this pendulum as 
particularly helpful in correcting controversies: 
 
[T]he more important any Controversy is, the more Reason there is for 
the Liberty of the Press, that [the people] may examine with all diligence 
imaginable the Tenets of their Adversaries as well as of their Guides; and 
that the more they heard the one Party, the more they should read the 
other; and that if they should fall into any Error by so doing, they would 
not be accountable for it.77 
 
Of course, the liberty of the press was not to remain unregulated. Even Toland 
felt the press required regulation in terms of civil matters when it “relates to 
Sedition and Treason.”78 These types of publications were to be “severely 
punished” because they are “pernicious to humane Societies.”79 Toland’s stance 
was that he merely opposed licensing and prior restraints. It was deemed a 
contradiction in terms for a free government to place prior restraints on the press, 
yet claim it a protected liberty. To Toland, the press was the means that “secure[d] 
all other Liberty,” and once it “falls into the hands of ill designing Men, nothing 
that we hold dear or precious is safe.”80 
Another prevalent late seventeenth-century tract is Charles Blount’s A Just 
Vindication of Learning and the Liberty of the Press. Blount was advocating the 
end of licensing even prior to the Glorious Revolution and was a firm advocate of 
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the idea that a free press guaranteed liberty.81 He hoped for the end of all licensing 
and the freedom to write as one may speak: 
 
Why should not I have the same freedom to Write, as to speak? If I speak 
any thing that is evil, I am liable to be punished, but yet I am never 
examined before I speak what I am about to say: So let not my Book be 
censured by one Interested Man alone in private, till it hath tried the 
publick Test; and then if there be any thing ill in it, I am ready to answer 
for it.82 
 
To Blount, the purpose of a “Free Press” was to tailor political “Fame and 
Ambition,” for it “hurries men into a necessity of acting Virtuously.”83 A free press 
without prior restraint ensured the dissemination of knowledge on history, divine 
worship, and philosophy, among others.84 Blount never advocated for an unbridled 
right to publish anything. He felt that publishing the truth should be a defense,85 
yet hoped falsehoods would still be punished according to the “present Laws of the 
Land subject to Fine and Imprisonment.”86 Blount also was the first to suggest that 
a free press would self-correct libels, for licentiousness was “more likely to be 
silenc’d by Liberty than by restraint.”87 In other words, the free discourse of ideas 
would counter and expose licentiousness as a means to reveal the truth. 
In 1704, Matthew Tindal expressed a similar view on the constitutional 
significance of a free press. He asserted that “there’s no Freedom either Civil or 
Ecclesiastical, but where the liberty of the Press is maintain’d; so wherever that is 
secur’d, all others are safe.”88 Tindal’s emphasis on civil and ecclesiastical matters 
is significant in that these subjects were the most regulated through the seventeenth 
century.89 The general fear was that an unbridled liberty to print on civil and 
ecclesiastical matters would lead to numerous abuses in misleading popular 
opinion. Tindal combated these fears by querying, “But how can these Abuses be 
discovered, if the Press be in their Hands that gain by them? What can be more 
useful than History, especially of ones own Country? and can we expect a true 
Information, when only one side is to print?”90 
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To be clear, Tindal viewed the “natural Right” of “Learning and 
Knowledg[e]” as extending to all subjects, including civil and ecclesiastical 
matters.91 The “Freedom of the Press contributes not only to endear Truth when 
discovered,” wrote Tindal, “but to the discovery of it; and if that fails, to  
make even Error itself innocent.”92 Like those before him,93 Tindal viewed the  
truth as a self-correcting principle. This included any false accounts affecting  
the government: 
 
And no Ministry can be hurt by the liberty of the Press, since they have a 
number of Dependents, ready upon all occasions to write in justification 
of their Conduct; nay, to gild over the worst of their Actions, and give a 
fair Colour to their most pernicious Designs . . . . 
The liberty of the Press must keep a Ministry within some tolerable 
Bounds, by exposing their ill Designs to the People, with whom if  
they once lose their Credit, they will be very unfit Tools for a Court to  
work with.94 
 
Tindal’s view of the press as the people’s check on government coincided 
with the works of Toland and Blount, but Tindal took it a step further. Unlike his 
predecessors,95 at no point did Tindal acquiesce to any form of libel. He believed 
that “all good Governments” consisted of the people “having the liberty of thinking 
on what Subject they please, and of as freely communicating their Thoughts.”96 
Tindal also differentiated himself from Toland and Blount in that he was against 
any law that required authors to submit their names. Tindal thought such a 
regulation could “only serve to hinder the publishing [of] the most useful Books, 
viz. those designed to rectify Abuses” by the government.97 Meanwhile, Toland 
viewed the setting of names of “either the Printer or Bookseller” to all books as 
“the most effectual way to prevent publishing” libelous and treasonous books.98 
Similarly, Blount recommended that if “Prudence” dictates any prior restraint on 
the press, it should be “provided that the Printer’s and the Author’s Name, or at 
least the Printer’s be registered.”99 
It is interesting that laws requiring the printing of the author’s name to curb 
licentiousness divided free press advocates. In 1712, John Asgill thought a name 
requirement to be a “most just and natural Remedy,” for libel prosecutions acted as 
“Paper Inquisition[s]; by which any Man may be arraign’d, judg’d, and condemn’d 
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. . . without ever knowing his Accusers.”100 However, other than this prior restraint, 
Asgill advocated for a virtually unrestrained free press: 
 
The Use and Intent of Printing, is (the same with that of Preaching) 
for communicating our Thoughts to others. 
And there is equal Reason (in it self) for suppressing the one as  
the other. 
But this Communication being the natural Right of Mankind (as 
sociable Creatures, and all embark’d in one common Salvation) the 
suppressing of either of these, is taking away the Childrens Bread. 
And in this Communication, Printing is more diffusive than 
Speaking. 
. . . . 
And tho several Errors have and will be vented by the Occasion of 
this Invention; this is no more an Argument against the Invention itself, 
than the growing of Tares among Wheat, is an argument against sowing 
of Corn. 
Nor any more Reason for suppressing it by a Law, than it would be 
for shutting up the Church-Doors, because Hypocrites cro[w]d the 
Church with true Worshipers.101 
 
Up to this point, commentators such as Toland, Blount, Tindal, and Asgill had 
attributed the origins of a free press to the principles of natural law, God’s will, 
and the belief that all free governments must maintain an open discourse of 
political ideas and knowledge. 
It was not until Joseph Addison penned Thoughts of a Tory Author that the 
liberty of the press was given any distinctive historical origins.102 In particular, 
Addison traced the origins of a free press to Rome,103 and he may have been the 
first to lay claim to the argument that a constitutional free press developed as a 
result of the Glorious Revolution.104 At no point did Addison directly attribute the 
origins of a free press to government action. Thus, one can assume that Addison 
knew the liberty of the press developed out of government inaction, for Parliament 
let the licensing bills expire.105 
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Perhaps it is this brief historical analysis that explains why Addison presented 
a “more representative position” than his predecessors.106 Addison advanced a 
position on the press that legitimately took into account “Legal Liberty” or the 
constitutional structure of popular government.107 Other commentators seemed to 
glance over the fact that government and its laws are instituted to ensure the public 
good, but not Addison: 
 
I believe all we mean by Restraining the Press, is to hinder the Printing 
of any Seditious, Schismatical, Heretical or Antimonarchical Pamphlets. 
We do not intend to destroy Printing itself or to abridge any one Set of 
Men of the Liberties of Englishmen; that is, of Writing and Printing what 
the Law allows; what may be consistent with our Loyalty to the Q—n, 
and our Love to the Publick Peace; what is not against Morals or Good 
Manners. And surely there may be a Restraint put upon such Things 
without striking at the Press itself, and ruining a Trade which has been so 
serviceable to Liberty and the Reformation.108 
 
At the time of Addison’s tract, truth was not a defense to seditious libel. 
Authors and printers could still be held accountable if their writings were deemed 
licentious or dangerous to the public peace. However, Addison believed that truth 
should serve as a defense. If a writing does “no Injury to the Reputation of any 
Man, but strikes at a Publick Grievance, a Reigning Vice, or Prevailing Folly,” 
wrote Addison, “why . . . shoul’d [we] make the Studies of such Men useless[?]”109 
Addison also argued for the defense of truth when criticizing government 
officials. He believed the best way to suppress libels was to remove any prior 
restraints, for this would require Ministers to give “as good an account of their 
Words and Actions as they can.”110 Seemingly borrowing from Toland’s argument 
on men’s duty to educate each other,111 Addison thought it “the Duty of every Man 
in a Free Nation to offer his Sentiments” on the government so long as it is done 
with “Modesty and Submission” to the law.112 He knew that “Printing is one of the 
Supports of Liberty,” but also that liberty requires “reasonable Regulations as the 
Royal Wisdom shall think convenient.”113 Regulations could even punish 
speculative truths and limit the liberty of the press to exactly “what is True, what 
every Body knows to be True, and no more.”114 
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Even opponents of a legally robust liberty of the press did not discount its 
customary existence. For instance, the conservative tract entitled Arguments 
Relating to a Restraint on the Press recognized a free press as an identifiable 
liberty, albeit on very limited terms.115 The tract’s author is unknown, but its legal 
analysis comports with early eighteenth-century practice. It concluded that the 
liberty of the press did not prevent any restraints that were consistent with the 
“Publick Good” and necessary to prevent injuries.116 In the words of William 
Blackstone, this would have meant that Parliament could pass any law that was 
“essentially interested . . . in the protection of every individual’s private rights, as 
modelled by the municipal law.”117 
Thus, in the interests of the public good, the eighteenth-century legislature 
could “compel the individual to acquiesce” to restraints on liberty.118 It permitted 
the legislature to balance the public “Necessity” of the press with its 
“Inconveniencies.”119 According to Arguments Relating to a Restraint on the 
Press, this meant it was within parliamentary authority to pass any laws 
concerning licensing, libel, authorship, and content without offending a free 
press.120 To interpret the English Constitution otherwise, it argued, was to prevent 
the enactment of any new laws except those that are merely “Explanatory of 
former ones,” which would be inconsistent with the rule that “The End of 
Parliaments is to amend the Kingdom.”121 
The anonymous author even disagreed with the notion that the press  
served any constitutional purpose in exposing political controversies. The  
English Constitution, he asserted, already provided a constitutional vehicle for  
this purpose: 
 
The law is open, said you, let them implead one another; Appeals to the 
People are of the most dangerous Consequence to all Magistracy: But 
that every Man may appeal to the Representatives of the People, the 
Triennial Act hath provided. 
. . . . 
. . . Are not the Lords and Commons a sufficient Bulwark against 
any Designs of arbitrary Power? Are not They better acquainted with the 
Boundaries of Royal Prerogative, and better prepar’d to resist any 
                                                          
115 See ARGUMENTS RELATING TO A RESTRAINT UPON THE PRESS, FULLY AND FAIRLY 
HANDLED IN A LETTER TO A BENCHER, FROM A YOUNG GENTLEMAN OF THE TEMPLE 5 
(London, R. & F. Bonwicke 1712) [hereinafter ARGUMENTS RELATING TO A RESTRAINT 
UPON THE PRESS]. 
116 See id. at 3–7. 
117 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 135 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765). 
118 Id. 
119 See ARGUMENTS RELATING TO A RESTRAINT UPON THE PRESS, supra note 115, at 5. 
120 See id. at 47–51. 
121 Id. at 6. 
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Invasion of their own, and the People’s Rights and Liberties, than every 
wanton and malevolent Boutefeu, that cries Fire, Fire, when there is most 
Danger of an Inundation?122 
 
As unfortunate as it may seem, this understanding of the free press was the 
living legal reality in the early eighteenth century. Since intellectuals were still 
debating whether “free-thinking” was a natural right,123 it is understandable why 
the liberty of the press was simply viewed as the ability to write and print as 
allowed by law.124 This does not dispel the fact that the philosophical and 
intellectual origins of a free press were developing in political thought. 
Clearly, the tracts of Toland, Blount, Tindal, and others were influential in the 
public discourse. And it should not be surprising that every argument Thomas 
Gordon and John Trenchard made on the subject of a free press in Cato’s Letters 
was borrowed from each of these early treatises. For instance, similar to Joseph 
Addison’s views on the historical relationship between infringing free speech and 
maintaining a free press,125 Thomas Gordon framed Roman history to argue that 
restraining free speech is what made the “wits” of “great and numerous authors . . . 
no more.”126 Gordon also borrowed from his predecessors on the subject of public 
libels. He asserted that truth should serve as a defense, writing: 
 
Nothing ought to be so dear to us as our country, and nothing ought to 
come in competition with its interests. Every crime against the publick is 
a great crime, though there be some greater than others. Ignorance and 
folly may be pleaded in alleviation of private offences; but when they 
come to be publick offences, they lose all benefit of such a plea: We are 
then no longer to consider what causes they are owing, but what  
evils they may produce, and here we shall readily find, that  
folly has overturned states, and private ignorance been the parent of  
publick confusion.127 
 
Thus similar to John Toland and Joseph Addison,128 Gordon viewed the 
exposing of “publick wickedness” as a “duty.”129 Although the law did punish 
                                                          
122 Id. at 14–15. 
123 Compare FREE THOUGHTS UPON THE DISCOURSE OF FREE THINKING (London, 
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126 Thomas Gordon, Of Freedom of Speech: That the Same is Inseparable from 
Publick Liberty (February 4, 1720), in 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S 
LETTERS 110, 114 (Ronald Hamowy ed., Indianapolis, Liberty Fund 1995) (1733). 
127 Thomas Gordon, Reflections upon Libelling (June 10, 1721), in 1 TRENCHARD & 
GORDON, supra note 126, at 228, 228. 
128 See ADDISON, supra note 102, at 16; TOLAND, supra note 72, at 5, 10. 
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individuals for public libels, and the truth did not serve as a defense to treason, 
Gordon believed this should no longer be the case. He understood that “libels 
against government” were “base and unlawful, and often mischievous; especially 
when governments are impudently charged with actions and designs of which they 
are not guilty.”130 Like Matthew Tindal and John Asgill before him,131 however, 
Gordon argued that this was an “evil arising out of a much greater good.”132 He 
argued, “[R]ather many libels should escape, than the liberty of the press should be 
infringed.”133 Gordon’s rationale was that a free press would require politicians to 
maintain honest dealings and individual virtue: 
 
Corrupt men, who have given occasion for reproach, by their base 
and dark practices with the late directors, being afraid of truths that affect 
them from the press, may be desirous of shutting it up: But honest men, 
with clear reputations, which they know foul mouths cannot hurt will 
always be for preserving it open, as a sure sign of liberty, and a cause  
of it.134 
 
At the same time, Gordon understood there had to be a legal line that no 
writer or printer could cross.135 Indeed, Gordon viewed a free press as providing a 
strong constitutional purpose, but it could not be completely unregulated. It is here 
that Gordon’s coauthor of Cato’s Letters, John Trenchard, turned the constitutional 
analysis of Arguments Relating to a Restraint on the Press on its head. Instead of 
the inconveniences from libels resulting in the necessity of press regulation,136 
Trenchard viewed most press regulations as inconveniencing religion, liberty, 
virtue, and knowledge.137 To Trenchard, the “Liberty of Writing” secured all other 
liberty.138 Hence the balance of liberty and libels worked the other way around.139 
Laws regulating the press were not to be given “more Indulgence to Detraction 
than is necessary to secure” liberty, for “it is certainly of much less Consequence 
                                                          
129 Gordon, supra note 127, at 228. 
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131 See ASGILL, supra note 100, at 4–5; TINDAL, supra note 88, at 13. 
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137 John Trenchard, A Discourse on Libels, in 2 CATO’S LETTERS 292, 295 (Russell & 
Russell, 3d ed. 1969) (1733). 
138 Id. at 294. 
139 Id. at 299 (“I would not be understood by what I have said, to argue that Men 
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to Mankind, that an Innocent Man should be now and then aspersed, than that all 
Men should be enslaved.”140 
In summary, Gordon and Trenchard were not articulating any new argument 
on the liberty of the press. Just as John Toland believed that prior restraint kept the 
people “more or less stupid and ignorant,”141 Trenchard asserted it would 
eventually overrun the world with “Barbarism, Superstition, Injustice, Tyranny, 
and the most stupid Ignorance.”142 Trenchard also borrowed from Toland to assert 
that the dissemination of innocent or minor libels was self-correcting:143 
 
[I]t is senseless to think that any Truth can suffer by being thoroughly 
searched, or examined into; or that the Discovery of it can prejudice right 
Religion, equal Government, or the Happiness of Society in any Respect: 
Truth has so many Advantages above Error, that she wants only to be 
shewn, to gain Admiration and Esteem; and we see every Day that she 
breaks the Bonds of Tyranny and Fraud and shines through the Mists of 
Superstition and Ignorance . . . .144 
 
As a matter of legal influence, Gordon and Trenchard’s essays seemingly had 
little, if any, effect on the English liberty of the press. Throughout most of the 
eighteenth century, English jurists did not acknowledge that such a right existed; 
thus it is understandable why Gordon and Trenchard’s writings on a free press 
never appeared in English court opinions or prominent legal treatises, nor were 
they restated in newspaper editorials. In the American colonies, however, Gordon 
and Trenchard’s free press writings would prove more influential. 
 
III.  THE ZENGER TRIAL AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FREE PRESS 
IN EARLY COLONIAL THOUGHT 
 
Despite having little to no influence in English jurisprudence, Thomas Gordon 
and John Trenchard’s writings on a free press became influential in the infamous 
Zenger trial. This influence can be traced to the dissemination of Cato’s Letters 
throughout the American colonies.145 It was not due to any form of originality that 
Cato’s Letters gained notoriety, for just as historians can trace the intellectual 
origins of the Second Amendment to John Toland and others,146 so too do the 
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intellectual origins of a free press begin with late seventeenth-century 
commentary.147 
The Zenger trial originated from a power struggle between New York 
Governor William Cosby and a political faction led by the former New York Chief 
Justice Lewis Morris, whom Cosby had recently fired.148 To combat his new 
political rival, Morris employed John Peter Zenger’s New-York Weekly Journal to 
publish a series of editorials vilifying Cosby as an opponent to law, liberty, and 
private property.149 It is here that the trial came to fruition, for the editorials would 
be the reason Zenger was prosecuted for seditious libel.150 
It all began with the series of editorials published in Zenger’s New-York 
Weekly Journal. Zenger did not write the editorials, but rather James Alexander, a 
member of Morris’s political party and the lawyer who would later represent 
Zenger, was the writer.151 In particular, the editorials argued in favor of a free press 
and echoed the political thought of Gordon, Trenchard, and his intellectual 
predecessors. In fact, Alexander’s first editorial begins by acknowledging 
“CATO,” that “excellent writer” on the “liberty of the press.”152 Alexander then 
wrote on the importance of a free press in checking tyranny: 
 
Exposing the exorbitant Crimes of wicked Ministers under a limited 
Monarchy, makes the Liberty of the Press, not only consistent with, but a 
necessary part of the Constitution itself. 
It is indeed urged, that the Liberty of the Press ought to be 
restrained, because not only the Actions of evil Ministers may be 
exposed, but the Character of the good ones traduced.153 
 
As a matter of positive law, liberty of the press did not exist in the American 
colonies.154 The tenets of libel extended to criticisms against government as well as 
                                                          
147 LEVY, supra note 56, at 89–118. 
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the people. However, Alexander invoked the writings of Gordon, Trenchard, and 
his predecessors to assert truth as a defense. “Truth will always prevail over 
Falsehood,” wrote Alexander.155 He believed the benefits of revealing the truth 
outweighed the inconveniences of a few potential falsehoods: 
 
Inconveniences are rather to be endured than that we should suffer an 
entire and total Destruction. . . . The Loss of Liberty in general would 
soon follow the Suppression of the Liberty of the Press; for as it is  
an essential Branch of Liberty, so perhaps it is the best Preservative of  
the whole.156 
 
Using history as a guidepost, Alexander further argued that virtuous 
politicians need not worry about a free press. “If Men in Power were always Men 
of Integrity, we might venture to trust them with the Direction of the [Press], and 
                                                          
154 See LARRY D. ELDRIDGE, A DISTANT HERITAGE: THE GROWTH OF FREE SPEECH IN 
EARLY AMERICA 23 (1994); Larry D. Eldridge, Before Zenger: Truth and Seditious Speech 
in Colonial America, 1607–1700, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 337 (1995). 
155 CATO, supra note 152. Although truth did not serve as a defense against seditious 
libel, this legal doctrine came under fire in the eighteenth century as incompatible with the 
liberty of the press. The 1770 pamphlet A Dialogue Between a Country Farmer and a 
Juryman, on the Subject of Libels illustrates this perfectly: 
 
C. Pray, where is the mighty difference between writing and speaking  
the truth. 
J. by writing the truth, it circulates more freely than speaking. 
C. Is that the reason why it is more criminal to write than to speak it? 
J. Yes. 
C. Then the law is made for the suppression of truth. 
J. I hope not. The law considers what is written, as the cool deliberate act 
of the mind, but imputes speaking to indiscretion and passion. 
C. This is no reason why a man may not both write and speak the truth. 
J. Most certainly not. But the law saith, truth may be defamatory. 
C. I cannot entertain so absurd an idea of the law. . . . 
C. Suppose a great man had betrayed his trust, embezzled the public 
treasure, sacrificed the rights of his fellow-subjects, or imposed upon his 
sovereign to induce him to exercise that prerogative which was vested in him for 
the benefit of the people in favor of the most abandoned wretch—Would it be 
criminal to state this man’s conduct to the public? 
J. I hope not—that doctrine might suit an arbitrary government, but it 
seems irreconcil[able] to the principles of a free state, and the genius of the 
English people. 
 
A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A COUNTRY FARMER AND A JURYMAN, ON THE SUBJECT OF LIBELS 
18–20 (London, Holborn 1770). 
156 CATO, Remainder of the Letter to the Editor, N.Y. WKLY. J., Nov. 19, 1733, at 1. 
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there would be no Occasion to plead against the Restraint of it.”157 Alexander even 
advanced John Toland’s stance that falsehoods would rectify themselves: 
 
I think, every Man of common Sense will judge that he is an Enemy to 
his King and Country who pleads for any Restraint upon the Press; but 
by the Press, when Nonsense, Inconsistencies, or personal Reflections 
are writ, if despised, they die of Course; if Truth, solid Arguments, and 
elegant, just Sentiments are published, they should be met with Applause 
rather than Censure . . . .158 
 
Naturally, Alexander’s editorials received a series of responses.159 In William 
Bradford’s New-York Gazette, Zenger’s newspaper rival, an anonymous editorial 
agreed that there should be no prior restraint of the press, yet felt that the 
“licentiousness of the press” should still be regulated.160 “Tis the abuse not the use 
of the press that is criminal and ought to be punished,” wrote the author.161 The 
South-Carolina Gazette published similar sentiments, stating that no restraint 
should be put on the press “in a nation that pretends to Liberty, but what is just 
sufficient to prevent Men from writing either Blastemy of the Treason.”162 
Meanwhile, in the American Weekly Mercury, Andrew Bradford163 may have been 
the first to claim that the liberty of the press was the “great Palladium of all our 
other Liberties”: 
 
But, by the Freedom of the Press, I mean a Liberty, within the Bounds of 
the Law, for any Man to communicate to the Public, his sentiments on 
the Important Points of Religion and Government; of proposing any 
Laws, which he apprehends may be the Good of his Countrey, and to 
applying for the Repeal of such, as he Judges pernicious. I mean a 
Liberty of detecting the wicked and destructive Measures of certain 
Politicians; of dragging Villany out of its obscure lurking Holes, and 
exposing it in its full Deformity to open Day; of attacking Wickedness in 
high Places, of disentangling the intricate Folds of a wicked and corrupt 
Administration, and pleading freely for a redress of Grievances: I mean a 
Liberty of examining the great Articles of our Faith, by the lights of 
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Scripture and Reason, a Privilege derived to us in its fullest Latitude, 
from our most excellent Charter.164 
 
Bradford’s reference to the liberty of the press as the “palladium of liberty” 
must be clarified, for the description is often used out of context or loosely by legal 
commentators to assert broad individual rights separate from government.165 The 
terminology is not intended to be broad or independent of government. In the 
eighteenth century, the “palladium of liberty” distinctly described rights or 
governmental checks that balanced the Constitution in favor of the people. These 
rights and governmental checks included political representation,166 freedom of 
election,167 the writ of habeas corpus,168 the right to trial by jury,169 the right to 
keep and bear arms in a well-regulated militia,170 and the freedom of the press.171 
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The press was especially termed the “palladium of liberty” because it was 
linked to the government of a free state, provided a vehicle by which the people 
learned about government, and could communicate the people’s thoughts to 
government officials. One anonymous editorial described the “Liberty of the 
Press” as the “Barrier of all the rest” or “in the highest Sense the Palladium of all 
other Liberty.”172 In other words, the press provided the people a means to lay 
“their own Sentiments by Reason and Argument” on the subject of “preserving” 
government, not destroying or dissolving it.173 This distinction is important, for 
even strong proponents of free press admitted that any “Abuses that dissolve 
Society, and sap the Foundations of Government, are not to be sheltered under the 
Umbrage of the Liberty of the Press.”174 
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of this debate was the identification of the 
liberty of the press as a customary right. One of Zenger’s editorials chastised the 
New-York Gazette for claiming the liberty of the press to be “one of the sacred and 
ESSENTIAL Priviledges of our Constitution.”175 Certainly, a free press preserved 
“any Political Constitution from being destroyed, and goes very far towards 
preventing Men of arbitrary and corrupt Principles” from overturning “any good 
Constitution, be it ecclesiastical or civil.”176 However, the anonymous editorial 
made sure to correct any notion that the constitution and liberty of the press were 
both “sacred.”177 There was a “Constitution in England long before Printing was 
known; and . . . long before we had a Printer.”178 
This begets the question, How did the liberty of the press qualify as a 
customary right in early eighteenth-century American constitutional thought? A 
right to a free press did not exist in any colonial or English charter, yet it was 
identified as one of the palladiums of liberty. Perhaps the answer rests with the 
Anglo-American view that “every Free Government” must “keep to its original 
Principles.”179 Given that one of these principles was affording the people the 
                                                          
M’Gillda & Co. 1812) (describing the right to trial by jury as the “grand palladium of all 
liberty and justice”). 
170 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
171 See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 81–82 (1799) (statement of Sen. Charles Pinckney) 
(describing the freedom of the press as the “great palladium of our liberties”); 23 JOURNALS 
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 815 (1914) (statement of David Howell) 
(describing freedom of the press as the “palladium of liberty”); GEORGE HAY, AN ESSAY 
ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 25 (Richmond, Samuel Pleasants, Junior 1803) (describing 
the freedom of the press as the “palladium of liberty” and “bulwark of freedom”). 
172 Britannus, Letter to the Examiner, Of the Principles of British Government, BOS. 
EVENING-POST, Mar. 15, 1736, at 1. 
173 Id. 
174 Philalethes, Letter to Editor, N.Y. WKLY. J., Nov. 4, 1734, at 3, col. 2. 
175 Letter to Editor, N.Y. WKLY. J., Oct. 21, 1734, at 2, col. 2. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Britannus, supra note 172, at 1. 
1720 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
 
means to preserve liberty, it was believed that a free press afforded this capability 
of governmental preservation better than free speech or petitioning representatives 
ever could.180 A free press gave authors the medium to express their concerns on 
balancing individual and collective liberty with governmental restraint. At the 
same time, however, the liberty of the press was subject to this very balancing. As 
one editorial under the penname Solon described it: 
 
No Country therefore, not even this Country, the freest of all others, 
can permit an universal Latitude of Speaking and Writing, and the 
Liberty of the Press, so highly and so justly valued amongst us, is and 
must be subject to certain Bounds. . . . 
The Liberty of the Press, is, therefore, no more, even in England, 
than the reasonable Liberty of Writing and Publishing whatever is 
consistent with the English Laws and Constitution.181 
 
Naturally, free press commentators deduced different customary origins. One 
commentator found the liberty of the press, “this Palladium of our Rights,” to 
originate from the “Principles” of the Glorious Revolution.182 Another traced it to 
the ancient constitutions of the Greeks and Romans to assert that the liberty of the 
press was an “inherent principle” for the preservation of the English 
constitution.183 The commentator claimed that when any system of government 
restricts the people “from the power of deciding” directly, “the ‘Liberty of the 
PRESS’ becomes much more necessary for preserving the liberties of the 
people.”184 Meanwhile, a third commentator viewed press freedom as derived from 
the “common right of Mankind,” and an integral part of “mix’d Government,” for 
it was deemed an extension of the people’s voice.185 
Though they may have differed in identifying its constitutional origins, almost 
all free press advocates viewed the right as essential to the preservation of the 
English constitution. In the words of one advocate, the liberty of the press was a 
“peculiar Privilege” that “must last as long as our Government remains, in any 
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degree, free and independent.”186 Interestingly enough, another stated that the 
“Freedom of the Press” did “not proceed from any Peculiarity in the Frame of the 
English Constitution,” but agreed it is “essential to and coeval with all free 
Governments, into which it is not adopted, but born.”187 
It is a historical point of emphasis that a free press was ideologically viewed 
as an extension of government itself. It was the means that provided people an 
“early, just, and complete information of the abuses of government.”188 It also 
served as the ultimate protection of liberties: 
 
The LIBERTY of the PRESS is the great Barrier of all LIBERTIES: For, 
How can any Branch of our LIBERTIES be said to be safe, if we have 
not the LIBERTY of Complaining of any Attempt to take it away? 
Though LIBERTY be Joint Stock, in Respect to the Nation, yet every 
Individual has a Property therein; and the Security he has for it, is his 
Right of Appealing to the Publick, if it’s invaded, or taken away.189 
 
As insightful as these affirmations of a free press may be, they do little to 
settle the debate of whether this “palladium of liberty” rests with the individual 
people, the collective people, the press as an industry, or all of the above.190 It is 
certainly arguable that the custom of print technology led to the development of an 
individual right for everyone to print their sentiments before the public. In 1749, 
Irish Chief Justice Thomas Marlay attributed the increase of libels to the 
“Invention of Printing” and “Printing-Presses” being so “common.”191 In 1712, 
John Asgill argued that regulating the liberty of the press was no more than 
regulating the “Invention itself.”192 In the same year, Joseph Addison took the 
opposite stance, arguing that regulations in the interests of the “Public Peace” were 
constitutional so long as they did not “destroy Printing itself or . . . abridge any one 
Set of Men of the Liberties of Englishmen.”193 
Conversely, we must consider that the liberty of the press protected the 
industry too. Just as the technological resources to print were growing in the 
eighteenth century, so too was the press industry. Nonetheless, the fact remains 
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that not everyone could be a printer due to costs and market demand. Establishing 
a newspaper or print shop required sufficient capital and a demographic base to 
derive readership. It was not a trade that all could maintain. 
Volokh is probably correct that anyone with sufficient capital could have 
invested in the then-expensive print technology,194 but this fails to take into 
account the economic risks associated with the venture, and, more importantly, 
whether each press was the embodiment of a constitutional free press or complied 
with rules respecting the “art of printing” as understood in eighteenth-century 
political thought. In other words, the underlying problem with Volokh’s textualist 
approach is that it does not take into account the growing customs of eighteenth-
century print culture. Is it really conceivable that eighteenth-century printers 
viewed themselves as only the maintainers of a press technology? Or did they view 
the liberty of the press as protecting their trade? 
These are difficult questions that textualism and ad hoc history cannot answer. 
It is important to note that as the liberty of the press grew as a customary popular 
right, so too did the perception of the constitutional roles of the printer or 
newspaper. Take for instance a 1753 essay by William Livingston195 entitled Of the 
Use, Abuse, and Liberty of the Press.196 A member of the 1787 Constitutional 
Convention, the First and Second Continental Congresses, and the first governor of 
New Jersey, Livingston wrote how the “Public has the Advantage of Sentiments of 
all its Individuals” through the medium of the press.197 The press was the “one 
common Center” that diffused “the bright Beams of Knowledge, with prodigious 
Dispatch, thro’ the vast Extent of the civilized World.”198 Livingston never 
discounted the liberty of all to write their sentiments or how the “Art of Printing” 
provided the means for individuals to “write undiscovered, as it is impossible to 
detect [the author] by the Types of the Press.”199 Also, like those political 
philosophers before him, Livingston did not view the liberty of the press as an 
unfettered right for all to publish whatever sentiments: 
 
We are so besotted with the Love of Liberty, that running into Extreams, 
we even tolerate those Things which naturally tend to its Subversion. 
And what is still more surprising, an Author justly chargeable with 
Principles destructive of our Constitution, with Doctrines the most abject 
and slavish, may proceed even with inveterate Malice, to vilify, 
burlesque and deny our greatest Immunities and Privileges, and shall yet 
be suffered to justify himself under the unrestrainable Rights of the 
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Press. An Absurdity grossly stupid and mischievous. What! Sap the 
Constitution, disturb the public tranquility, and rule the State, and yet 
plead a Right to such Liberty derived from the Law of that State!200 
 
Certainly, the laws against libel curbed such licentiousness, but Livingston 
also understood the intermediary role the press served in this process. Every printer 
had to first consider whether to publish articles in the interests of the public good. 
This free press function not only served the “Promotion of the public Welfare,” 
wrote Livingston, but was also a “political Virtue” among printers.201 The true 
constitutional purpose of a free press did not include a right to “publish every 
Thing that is offered” to a printer.202 Instead, the “true Limits” and “rightful 
Extent” of a free press was the truth or that which is “conducive of general 
Utility.”203 Livingston viewed printers that did not follow these constitutional 
guidelines as “Enemies to the Press and the Public,” and mocked them as having 
the “Impudence to talk of the Liberty of the Press.”204 
Livingston’s Of the Use, Abuse, and Liberty of the Press was of such 
influence that The New England Magazine of Knowledge and Pleasure reprinted it 
with modifications in 1758. Following Livingston’s lead in denouncing unvirtuous 
printers as the “Tool[s] of a [political] Party,”205 the modified reprint established 
guidelines for a free press run by virtuous printers: 
 
[Printers should] open their Presses to every Writer whose Opinions have 
not a natural Tendency to hurt the Societies of which they are Members; 
preserve sacred and inviolate the Secrets of their Correspondents; abstain 
from publishing any Thing that may prove injurious to the Characters of 
honest Men; and, whenever the Reputation of their Fellow-Creatures is 
attacked, give them the fairest Opportunity of defending themselves 
through their Presses; and above all, be ready to print any Thing that is 
advancive of the Public Weal, without regarding the narrow Resentments 
of Party: But towards their own Security, I would have them remember 
the Danger of libeling; and endeavor to acquire that Medium of 
Discretion through which the Public may be well served, the People well 
informed, and Them-selves well secured.206 
 
The delicate balance to be struck between a newspaper’s liberty to print on a 
story and the benefits the story imposed upon the community was a serious issue in 
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mid-eighteenth-century political discourse. Printing anything and everything did 
not advance the liberty of the press virtuously. The liberty of the press was never a 
carte blanche to “defame and slander the Proceedings of Government” because it 
may “injure[] the Publick by defaming what [the author] does not understand and 
can’t mend.”207 For the liberty of the press to “answer any true and valuable End” 
of government, it must “promote the Welfare of Mankind, [or] it’s good for 
nothing; and when perverted to a contrary Purpose, is as pernicious and criminal, 
as any other Sort of Licentiousness.”208 
As long as the press followed these basic tenets, the role it could play in 
advancing the public good of society was immeasurable.209 For instance, John 
Holt’s The New-York Journal, or General Advertiser discussed the role a 
competing Virginia press played in removing a government monopoly.210 With the 
introduction of “another Printer, not dependent on the Governor’s Favour,” wrote 
Holt, it became “vain to continue the Restraint” on the government press and 
resulted in “two free Presses.”211 The Providence Gazette also published an 
editorial classifying the print media as crucial to the success of liberty. The 
editorial was a reprint from a London newspaper, which argued that the “Rise of 
NEWS-PAPERS” was a “chief Barrier of our Liberty.”212 The editorial continued: 
 
NEWS-PAPERS, not only convey Instruction and Amusement, but when 
properly conducted, secure to us the Liberty of the Press.—There is 
another great Advantage which the Increase of News-Papers has 
procured us:—Ignorance is not so prevalent; News-Papers have given 
People a Taste for Reading; this occasions all useful Knowledge to be 
cultivated and encouraged . . . .213 
 
The editorial’s reference to “properly conducted” conveys the all-important 
role that the press served in ensuring the truth, veracity, and impartiality of its 
contents. Printers were cognizant of the role they played in disseminating news. 
Indeed, printers sought to make a profit, but to virtuous members of the press 
industry a free press was not merely the right of individuals to publish anything. In 
the words of one editorial, “The liberty of the Press is not an indivisible quantity; 
but a quantity composed of a great number of parts.”214 
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Undoubtedly, numerous printers viewed their trade as one of the “parts” the 
liberty of the press protected. For instance, William Goddard, owner of the 
Providence Gazette, wrote an editorial conveying this very point: 
 
The Printer thinks he may here observe, without an Appearance of 
Ostentation, that during the small Progress of his Business, in this Place, 
it has in many Respects proved beneficial to the true Interest of the 
whole Colony.215 
 
Goddard made sure to remind his readers that the “Liberty of the Press is 
[styled] the very Basis and Bulwark of [the British] Constitution, and its truest 
Safeguard, amidst the rude Attacks of Arbitrary Power.” 216 He even felt the 
Providence Gazette contributed to this end: 
 
[I]ts Circulation has been rendered very extensive, and has happily met 
with general Approbation of the Public, for its useful and agreeable 
Contents, as well as for its Freedom and Impartiality. . . . A Public Paper, 
well conducted, is allowed by the most sensible People to be very 
serviceable to a Community . . . .217 
 
The view of the press as a constitutionally protected entity reached new 
proportions from the late 1760s through the adoption of the Declaration of 
Independence. In particular, the press played a significant role in criticizing the 
Stamp Act and ultimately contributed to its repeal.218 Virtually no one doubted the 
role that printers, editors, and newspapermen played in unifying colonial 
opposition to the Stamp Act. “Had it not been for the continual information from 
the Press,” remarked one editorial, “a junction of all the people on this northern 
continent . . . would have been scarcely conceivable.”219 Another editorial 
commented, “The press hath never done greater service since its first invention.”220 
Meanwhile, one editorial was even so bold to exclaim that the press and the 
maintainers of its freedom were the “ark of God, for the safety of the people.”221 
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Suffice it to say, the constitutional significance of the liberty of the press was 
at its height leading up to the outbreak of the American Revolution. In fact, the 
press was often toasted, especially during celebrations commemorating the repeal 
of the Stamp Act. In 1768 it was reported that the people in New York not only 
toasted the “patriotic Author of the Farmer’s Letters,” John Dickinson, but also the 
“Liberty of the Press.”222 Five years later, New York would again toast the 
“LIBERTY of the PRESS,” and such memorable free press supporters as 
Alexander McDougall, John Wilkes, Andrew Hamilton, John Peter Zenger, and 
even “Zenger’s Jury, who regardless of the Directions of the Court, refused to 
bring in a special Verdict, and acquitted the Prisoner.”223 Meanwhile, in 1768 in 
Boston, a toast was made to “The Farmer,” “The Boston Gazette, and the Worthy 
Members of the House who vindicated the Freedom of the Press.”224 
Toasts to the liberty of the press were not limited to commemorating the 
repeal of the Stamp Act.225 On August 14, 1768, Boston celebrated the “first 
Opposition to the Stamp Act,” and toasted the Federal Farmer, John Wilkes, the 
“Republic of Letters,” and the “LIBERTY of the PRESS.”226 On November 1, 
1769, New York celebrated its opposition to “surrender[ing] their Rights to 
arbitrary Power,” toasting the Federal Farmer, the “Authors of the Boston Journal 
of Occurrences,” John Wilkes, the “Liberty of the Press, and Confusion to all 
Imprimaturs,” and the “Printers who nobly disregarded the detestable Stamp Act, 
preferring the public Good to their private interest.”227 
As these examples show, American colonists not only viewed the press as a 
technological advancement to publish the people’s sentiments. They toasted 
writers, newspapers, free press advocates, and even the printers who fought the 
Stamp Act. Sometimes the word “press” was capitalized, emphasizing the 
significance of a free press in eighteenth-century constitutionalism. To the 
Americans who waded through the constructs of the revolution, the press advanced 
the public good by exposing the ministry and publishing the views of the colonies. 
 
IV.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL UTILITY OF A FREE PRESS: 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE PRE-CONSTITUTION YEARS 
 
The role of the press in thwarting the Stamp Act is often understated, yet 
crucial to understanding the evolution of the liberty of the press in American 
constitutionalism. In fact, Alexander McDougall used the role that a free press 
                                                          
222
 PROVIDENCE GAZETTE; & COUNTRY J., Apr. 9, 1768, at 3, col. 1. 
223 N.Y. GAZETTE, OR, WKLY. POST-BOY, Mar. 26, 1770, at 1. 
224 MASS. GAZETTE & BOS. NEWS-LETTER, Mar. 24, 1768, at 3. 
225 See, e.g., N.Y. GAZETTE, OR, WKLY. POST-BOY, Oct. 22, 1770, at 3, col. 2; Friday, 
September 16th, AM. ARCHIVES, http://lincoln.lib.niu.edu/cgi-bin/amarch/getdoc.pl?/var/ 
lib/philologic/databases/amarch/.1046/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2012). 
226 POSTSCRIPT TO BOS. NEWS-LETTER, Aug. 25, 1768, at 1. 
227 MASS. GAZETTE & BOS. WKLY. NEWS-LETTER, Nov. 9, 1769, at 2, col. 2. 
2012] SAVING THE PRESS CLAUSE FROM RUIN 1727 
played in repealing the Stamp Act to assert his defense against libel.228 He 
reminded the people that for five years “the American Press has been boldly 
imployed in asserting the Right of this Country, to an Exemption from  
British Taxation.”229 
The public discourse concerning the Stamp Act, however, was just the 
beginning. Throughout the imperial crisis, proponents and opponents of American 
liberty both claimed that their stance fell within the legal restraints of the liberty of 
the press, while arguing that their counterparts had overstepped the bounds of its 
doctrine. Those who prematurely spoke of American independence were often 
deemed English traitors, and the same held true for printers who took the 
counterpoint, though the latter experienced far more public persecution. 
One such printer was Samuel Loudon, who decided to publish a reply to 
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense.230 Loudon was hauled off in the middle of night 
and witnessed the plates, impressions, and manuscript of the tract burned before 
his eyes.231 Upon inquisition, Loudon asserted the privilege to not divulge the 
manuscript’s source.232 He was appalled with how the liberty of the press was so 
“boldly attacked,” and his written defense reveals the role each printer served in 
confirming the truth and veracity of their prints: 
 
As a publication of this nature required mature deliberation, I did not 
incline, nor did the gentlemen [who supplied the manuscript] require me, 
to comply with his proposal till I should be convinced that the 
manuscript was written with decency, or did not express, or even imply, 
any disapprobation of the proceedings of the honorable Continental 
Congress, or the glorious cause in defence of which Americans are 
spending their blood and treasure. Being satisfied as to these particulars, 
I agreed to print the manuscript on my own account.233 
 
Loudon also defended his actions on account of America not yet declaring 
independence. “American Independence hath not, to the best of my knowledge, 
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been decided by the Continental Congress, nor by any legal subordinate 
Convention,” he wrote.234 Clearly, Loudon understood that the law of seditious 
libel prevented him from publishing anything treasonous. However, he questioned 
why he could not challenge the issue of American independence if it had not yet 
been settled. Certainly, at the time, it was a question of the “greatest importance” 
and “should not [have been] decided before [the] arguments [were] fully 
discussed” in the public discourse: 
 
The publick will determine whether, by not suffering any persons to 
publish their sentiments but the author of [Common Sense], and such as 
have adopted this way of thinking, many thousands of steady friends to 
the common cause of America are not deprived of one of their essential 
privileges—the liberty of declaring their opinion upon a subject of the 
greatest moment, and in which they are unspeakably more interested than 
the supposed author of that pamphlet?235 
 
Overall, Loudon’s point was a simple one: the liberty of the press ensures the 
open discourse of political measures that are not adverse or treasonous to 
constitutional government. In the future, Loudon hoped the true “freedom of the 
Press” would ensure that “all political publications” would be “legally and 
impartially tried, by the publickly avowed principles of the Colonies,” not by 
“nocturnal assaults upon printers.”236 
Similar plights faced moderate or loyalists printers throughout the American 
colonies. In March 1775, over a year before the outbreak of hostilities at Lexington 
and Concord, James Rivington was charged with spreading “jealousies, fear, 
discord, and disunion” throughout the colonies.237 Particularly, he was accused of 
having “disgorged from his infamous Press, the most virulent, foul abuse, on the 
Members of the late Continental Congress,” and the Newport Committee 
recommended his publication be banned from dissemination.238 The Committee’s 
reasoning being: 
 
[T]he freedom of the Press is of the utmost importance to civil society; 
and that its importance consists, “besides the advancement of truth, 
science, morality, and arts in general, its diffusion of liberal sentiments 
on the administration of Government, its ready communication of 
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thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union 
among them . . .” [and] therefore it is the duty of every friend of Civil 
Government to protect, and preserve from violation, that invaluable right, 
that noble pillar, and great support of Public Liberty; and to countenance 
and encourage the Press, so long as it shall be employed in promoting 
those beneficial purposes.239 
 
New Windsor, New York followed the steps taken by the Newport Committee 
and banished Rivington’s newspaper. It was resolved, “[W]e consider the Freedom 
of the Press as the great palladium of English liberty; therefore we will do all in 
our power to encourage and support the same.”240 The town accused Rivington’s 
paper of lacking “every principle of honour, truth, or modesty,” and having its 
“pieces replete with falsehoods and mere chicanery, only designed . . . to divide 
and lead astray the friends of our happy Constitution . . . .”241 
Naturally, not all colonists agreed with the banishing of Rivington’s paper. 
One letter chastised the Committee as making a “most flagrant attack upon the 
liberty of the press” and taking “infinite pains . . . to stop the circulation of 
moderate publications . . . .”242 Meanwhile, Major Benjamin Floyd and “a great 
number of others” responded that the revolutionaries were suppressing the  
free press: 
 
Do you really mean to immure the Colonies in Popish darkness, by 
suppressing the vehicles of light, truth, and liberty? Are none to speak, 
write, or print, but by your permission? Does a conscience of guilt and 
tyranny hurry the Committees to starve and murder our virtuous Printers? 
. . . A free Press has been the honour and glory of Englishmen; by it our 
most excellent Constitution has been raised to greater perfection than any 
in the world. But we are become the degenerate plants of a new and 
strange vine; and now it seems ignorance must be the mother of both 
devotion and politicks.243 
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The case of James Rivington was just one example of how the free press 
divided revolutionaries and loyalists. Numerous proclamations and editorials were 
published debasing the other side as violators of a free press, especially those who 
did not support prorevolutionary governments.244 To many, the liberty of the press 
was thought to extend only to printers and writers in support of their side. Still, 
both the Newport and New Windsor Committees were clear that the “freedom of 
the Press” was more than just writing and publishing what individuals pleased; the 
press in itself was an entity that needed to be encouraged to promote beneficial 
purposes such as the advancement of truth and knowledge.245 
Following the Stamp Act, the press was seen as particularly important in 
defending liberty against usurpation. As one editorial described it: 
 
The liberty of the press [is] . . . a privilege ever dear to Englishmen, as it 
is an engine fruitful of mighty events, in battering down the strong holds 
of the powerful. It should always be viewed with jealousy, and defended 
at every hazard. Tyrants have often felt its force, and wreaked their 
malice against it. Says the ingenious [David] Hume, “It is sufficiently 
known that arbitrary power would steal in upon as,” we’re we not 
extremely watchful to prevent its progress, and were there not an easy 
way of conveying the alarm from one end of the Kingdom to the other. 
The spirit of the people must frequently be roused, in order to curb the 
ambition of the Court, and the dread of that spirit’s being roused must be 
employed to prevent that ambition. Nothing [is] so effectual to this 
purpose as the liberty of the press . . . . It is equally open to the Court and 
the Country, to the man in publick life, and the private speculator, who 
may have the world for his theatre, and the publick for the object of his 
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beneficence, while buried in obscurity, and confined to the smoke of his 
own chimney.246 
 
What this statement reveals is that a free press had constitutional layers or 
parts outside of its capabilities as a technology. This included the role of 
newspapers as the bulwark of liberty. In the words of one contemporaneous 
commentator, newspapers were the “common channel of conveyance for modern 
addressers to Governours, Generals, and Kings.”247 They were of central 
importance to the exercise of the freedom of the press.248 In particular, a 
newspaper’s distribution made the newspaper available to all who were willing to 
read or subscribe to it. Its contents were capable of being influenced by all sides 
and all professions through the submission of editorials or advertisements. In the 
words of printer William Goddard, “[O]ur newspapers, those necessary and 
important alarms in time of publick danger, may be rendered of little consequence” 
without the freedom to circulate.249 This did not mean that a free press permitted 
the publication of anything or everything. Virtuous printers subscribed to the tenets 
of impartiality and ensured their newspaper’s contents were respectable.250 As 
Goddard wrote in his own newspaper, the liberty of the press did not include 
“publishing all the Trash which every rancorous, illiberal, anonymous Scribbler” 
might send to the printer, for it may be inconsistent “with the Gratitude, Duty, and 
Reverence [a printer] owes to the Public.”251 
Other contemporaries agreed with this understanding of a free press and 
sought to maintain a truthful, open, and impartial discourse. An “entirely free” 
press was supposed to be “open to all Parties, but influenced by none.”252 The 
hypocritical stance by extralegal colonial assemblies did not go unnoticed. It made 
little sense for said assemblies to claim violations of the press, yet not be 
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transparent in their own proceedings.253 It was firmly believed that the liberty of 
the press, the “peculiar excellency of the British Constitution,” required the 
“proceedings of all publick bodies should be freely discussed” and be laid before 
the people.254 
These arguments, however, did little to prevent extralegal colonial assemblies 
from suppressing moderate and loyalist printers.255 On the other hand, for the 
purposes of historical context, many members of Congress were open to dissenting 
points of view in newspapers. They understood the liberty of the press to protect 
this. For instance, when Eldridge Gerry and Henry Laurens sought to charge John 
Dunlap with libeling Congress, Merriweather Smith, Thomas Burke, and John 
Penn opposed this attempt on free press grounds.256 Smith commented he had read 
Dunlap’s paper and “thought it contained several good things.”257 He believed that 
when the “liberty of the Press shall be restrained . . . the liberties of the People will 
be at an end.”258 Burke thought such a charge was “lowering and disgracing the 
dignity of the Congress to take any notice of the Printer or Author,” asking, 
“[W]hat shall we get by the enquiry?”259 Meanwhile, Penn agreed with Smith, 
stating, “The liberty of the Press ought not to be restrained.”260 Indeed this came 
with the caveat that Dunlap’s publication had “good designs,” but it conveys that 
there was some discussion over the propriety of silencing the opposition.261 
Furthermore, Edward Langworthy, a Continental Congress member from 
Georgia, wrote to William Dauer that he would “rejoice to see more publications 
on the proceedings of Congress, [for] a little gentle Satyr will be useful on many 
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occasions & will restrain the Spirit of Intrigue & Cabal.”262 Langworthy was not 
the only member to take notice of the importance of a truly free press. In the midst 
of the imperial crisis, William Hooper wrote how it made little sense to silence the 
Tory opposition: 
 
Strange Infatuation that while we contend with enthusiastick ardor for 
the liberty of the press ourselves that we should with such an intolerating 
spirit deny it to others. It is a strange freedom that is confined to one side 
of a Question! Doctrines in politicks that will not bear a freedom of 
discussion carry with them more than a suspicion of being erroneous, and 
I am confident that the world will not be so easily gulled in these as in 
the unquestionable mysteries of Church faith. They will take the freedom 
to think for themselves, & even to condemn what will not upon fair 
dispassionate enquiry stand the test of solid reason & sound Criticism. I 
do not mean to insinuate that the [opposition] . . . has merit . . . . Be that 
as it will, Neglect would be [their] greatest punishment. Let [them] speak 
in obscurity, Persecution is what [they] covet[].263 
 
Thus, contrary to the practice of many extralegal colonial assemblies, cooler 
heads understood the constitutional purpose of a free press. Truth, impartiality, and 
the free discourse of the news were its tenets. John Adams conveyed the 
importance of truth while serving on a diplomatic mission in Paris. Adams 
commented that the “liberty of the press by no means includes a right of imposing 
on mankind . . . detestable forgeries.”264 He was against printers “artfully 
perform[ing]” political lies upon the world, for they poison the “morals of the 
people, the pure and single source of which is truth . . . .”265 Adams felt it 
important that America’s “character for truth, sincerity, and candor” not be 
tarnished by false claims of the press.266 Perhaps most importantly, Adams did not 
solely view the liberty of the press as an invention for the people to convey their 
sentiments. He also knew that newspapers, printers, and editors maintained a 
significant role in public opinion and could even influence international relations. 
Adams felt a free press was the means by which elected representatives’ 
“characters and conduct” were known to the people.267 
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Future U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Cushing also viewed a free press 
as embodying more than the freedom to write and publish. He queried to Adams, 
“Without this liberty of the press could we have supported our liberties against 
[B]ritish administration? or could our revolution have taken place?”268 Here, 
Cushing was referring to the utility of newspapers to influence public opinion 
during the imperial crisis and in support of American independence. Undoubtedly 
the liberty to publish one’s sentiments was part of this utility, but printers could not 
publish anything and everything without violating the law and public trust.269 
After assuming the Supreme Court bench, Cushing personally conveyed this 
legal fact in a charge to the grand jury, which defended the constitutionality of the 
controversial 1798 Sedition Act. While acknowledging the liberty of the press was 
placed upon a “just and equitable foundation,” its equity only extended to “truths 
. . . essential to the preservation of any free government,” not to “malicious lies 
and slander, which no man possessed of any principle of virtue or honesty, would 
indulge himself in.”270 To be clear, Cushing was not denouncing the utility of a 
free press to legitimately criticize government. The liberty of the press protected 
the “undoubted right” of the people to “express their opinion upon public matters, 
in a decent manner.”271 To be decent, however, meant that the opinion must be 
both candid and true. As Cushing put it, the liberty of the press ceases when 
presses “print and propagate scandalous and malicious falsehoods, to the injury of 
the public, which no man of virtue or modesty will pretend, any more than liberty 
of action admits of committing murder, theft, or any other crime.”272 
The doctrines of constitutional equity and utility and their interrelationship 
with the purpose of a free press were deeply intertwined in late eighteenth-century 
thought and practice. A virtuous printer understood the utility a free press served in 
American society.273 It was not by chance that on the front page of every 
Freeman’s Journal was the popular free press creed, “OPEN to ALL PARTIES, 
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but INFLUENCED by NONE.”274 Following the repeal of the Stamp Act, the 
statement began appearing in the headlines of numerous colonial newspapers275 
and reflected the role of the eighteenth-century press as the purveyor of truth, 
impartiality, and liberty. The same can be said for The Independent Gazetteer, 
which included on the top of every edition of the newspaper Article XII of the 
1776 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights276 and the popular Junius quote, “Let it 
be impressed upon your Minds, let it be instilled into your Children, that the 
Liberty of the Press is the PALLADIUM of all the civil, political, and religious 
Rights of Freemen.”277 The inclusion of both references shows the constitutional 
role that printers placed upon their presses in American society as an entity, not 
merely as holders of a technology.278 Similarly, the New Hampshire Mercury 
always included Section XXII of the 1784 New Hampshire Bill of Rights on its 
front page: “The Liberty of the Press is essential to the Security of Freedom in a 
State—It ought therefore to be inviolably preserved.”279 It conveys the printer’s 
view that newspapers were to be “inviolably preserved” to the utility  
of the Republic. 
Arguably newspaper printers, editors, and writers did not see themselves as 
any more protected by the liberty of the press than the right to publish without 
                                                          
274 For an example, see FREEMAN’S J. (Phila.), Dec. 23, 1789, at 1. The creed can be 
found in many earlier newspapers. See, e.g., BOS. EVENING-POST, Aug. 26, 1771, at 3, col. 
1; MASS. SPY, Mar. 14, 1771, at 1 (advertising the contents of The Massachusetts Spy). 
275 See, e.g., MASS. SPY, Mar. 14, 1771, at 1; N.Y. CHRON., June 8, 1769, at 1. 
276
 PA. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, art. XII (“That the people have a right to 
freedom of speech, and of writing, and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom 
of the press ought not to be restrained.”). 
277 For an example, see INDEP. GAZETTEER & AGRIC. REPOSITORY (Phila.), Nov. 20, 
1790, at 1. 
278 The founding generation indeed recognized the benefits and burdens of the press 
as a technology, but this is only one aspect of the Press Clause. See Liberty of the Press, 
TIME PIECE (N.Y.C.), July 13, 1798, at 1 (“All those means which render the progress of 
the human mind more easy, more rapid, more certain, are also the benefits of the press. 
Without the instruments of this art such books could not have been multiplied as are 
adapted to every class of readers, and every degree of instruction. To the press we owe 
those continued discussions which alone can enlighten doubtful questions and fix upon an 
immovable basis, truths too abstract, too subtle, too remote from the prejudices of the 
people, or the common opinion of the learned, not soon to be forgotten or lost.”); 
Republicus, Observations on the Liberty of the Press, AM. MONITOR (N.Y.C.), Oct. 1785, 
at 5–6 (“I must acknowledge the LIBERTY of the PRESS has been greatly abused by 
many, and this useful Machine has often been subservient to the worst of purposes, by 
being made an Engine of ushering much obscenity, nonsense and folly into  
publick view . . . .”). 
279 N.H. MERCURY, & GEN. ADVERTISER, Mar. 15, 1785, at 1. It should be noted that 
the New Hampshire Mercury’s punctuation and formatting did not coincide with section 
XXII of the 1784 New Hampshire Bill of Rights, which read, “The liberty of the press is 
essential to the security of freedom in a state: It ought, therefore, to be inviolably 
preserved.” N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXII (amended 1968). 
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prior restraint. Such an argument, however, fails to take into consideration the 
ideological and philosophical origins of a free press and its development by the 
late eighteenth century. In the midst of the American Revolution, nine states 
included variations of the liberty of the press in their respective constitutions.280 It 
was the first time in the pantheon of Anglo-American history that the liberty of the 
press, free press, or the freedom of the press was codified as a constitutional 
right.281 From its origins in the Glorious Revolution, the liberty of the press in 
England had only been recognized in the popular print culture.282 It had gained 
acceptance through government inaction, not affirmative recognition,283 and it was 
not until 1770 that the King’s Bench recognized the right, albeit limiting its tenets 
to prior restraint.284 
The American perception of a free press seemingly evolved much faster than 
it had in England. Years before William Blackstone penned his Commentaries on 
the liberty of the press,285 the American colonies had already recognized the 
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constitutional significance of a free press.286 In particular, the Stamp Act and 
subsequent British measures had affirmed the importance of newspapers in 
checking tyrannical government.287 By 1769 the liberty of the press was dubbed by 
one commentator as a “jewel of inestimable value,” which “ought to be defended 
with our lives and fortunes, for neither will be worth enjoying, when freedom is 
destroyed by arbitrary measures.”288 Another commentator described it as the “one 
eye” that had the “public view” of liberty in mind.289 
The American victory in the war for independence only further cemented the 
constitutional significance of a free press. Indeed, a major part of this freedom was 
the ability of the people to publish their sentiments without prior restraint, but the 
liberty of the press had also developed into an industrial right as well. Take for 
instance the view of the Massachusetts Spy and its role as a free press: 
 
The Free Use of the PRESS, has ever been acknowledged one of the 
greatest Blessings of Mankind, especially when its PRODUCTIONS tend 
to defend the GLORIOUS CAUSE of LIBERTY; and to point out to the 
world, those base and wicked arts of designing men, who fain would set 
nations together by the ears, and involve the whole kingdoms in slavery! 
Part of the design of this paper, is, to assist in detecting, and 
exposing to public view, those miscreants who, for the sake of private or 
public advantage to themselves, would sacrifice both their King and 
Country. And to help, as much as possible, in maintaining and supporting 
that LIBERTY for which our Fathers suffered in transferring it to us. To 
effect which, a great regard will always be paid to such political pieces as 
tend to secure to us our invaluable rights and priviledges. 
The other part of the publisher’s design is, to give as copious a view 
as possibly can be obtained, of all Foreign Affairs, and the freshest 
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Intelligence from Great-Britain, as it may from time to time arrive; and 
that which concerns the colonies, shall be particularly noticed in  
this paper.290 
 
Here, the free press included open access, productions in support of the 
people’s liberty, and easy access to world news. The eighteenth-century public 
viewed a free press as more than just a technological medium. The founding 
generation, particularly printers, foresaw the constitutional evolution of a free press 
in terms of utility.291 Inspired by Jean De Lolme’s The Constitution of England, the 
State Gazette included the following: 
 
FROM the great utility . . . which every man is enabled to communicate 
his sentiments to the public, and the general concern which matters 
relative to government are always sure to create; a prodigious number of 
publications are continually making their appearance; so as to 
communicate to several measures adopted by administration, as well as 
whatever is advanced by either the advocates or judges, concerned in the 
management and decision of any cause or suit of importance in any court 
of law or equity. By that means the public are made acquainted with the 
nature of the subject that have been deliberated upon in the assembly of 
their representatives . . . .292 
 
The editorial then quoted De Lolme’s treatise directly: 
 
It will, I am aware, be thought that I speak in too high terms, of the 
effects produced by public newspapers. I indeed confess that every piece 
they contain are not patterns of good reasoning, or of the true attic wit: 
On the other hand, it never fails but that a subject in which the laws,  
or the welfare of the community, are really concerned; calls forth  
some able writer, who communicates to the public his observations  
and complaints.293 
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Through “the assistance of the Press,” the editorial concluded, “every 
individual may, at his leisure and in retirement, inform himself of everything  
worth knowing.”294 
De Lolme’s understanding of the liberty of the press is of particular 
significance, for he attributed its origins to custom. It was a “privilege” that was 
“obtained by the English Nation, with the greatest difficulty, and latest in point of 
time, at the expence of the Executive power.”295 Although De Lolme did not use 
the word “utility,” he described the benefits of a free press in utilitarian terms: as 
that which is in the interest of the public good.296 He understood the constitutional 
benefits of newspapers in advancing the liberty of the press, as well as those 
standardized daily, weekly, and monthly publications.297 One of these benefits was 
that a free press provided the people with the advantage of preserving their 
“important rights,” what De Lolme referred to as the right of “ultimate 
resistance.”298 The medium of the press, “this right of resisting, itself,” wrote De 
Lolme, is “vain, when there exists no means of effecting a general union between 
the different parts of the People.”299 
Perhaps most importantly, it was this interpretation that eighteenth-century 
Americans took from De Lolme’s treatise. Other contemporaneous articles and 
editorials conveyed the constitutional utility afforded by newspapers. For instance, 
borrowing from De Lolme, the Vermont Gazette commented on how the liberty of 
the press, particularly newspapers, formed a “counterpoise to the power” of 
government.300 The writer believed De Lolme’s analysis proved “the great 
advantages that people derive from Newspapers, in which the most important 
political subjects are publicly discussed.”301 To be more succinct, a free press not 
only offered a technological medium for the people to convey their sentiments,  
but also was an entity that “roused,” “united,” and “animated” the people  
with information.302 
The Freeman’s Journal also published an editorial on the utility of the press. 
Newspapers were seen as providing essential information to the people and their 
representatives: “Every man who feels interested in his own fate . . . should apply 
to the NEWSPAPER, the faithful register of the transactions of the day; its pages 
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testify concerning public men and public measures.”303 Newspapers were the “true 
and only sure channel” by which representatives could “study the interest of their 
constituents, and consult the good of the great whole” in passing laws.304 It was the 
entity that must “sound an alarm when danger is at hand; for the destruction of a 
FREE PRESS will be the first object with men determined to enslave their  
fellow citizens.”305 
American newspapers sometimes even reprinted the English editorials on the 
utility of newspapers in effectuating a free press. For instance, the New Hampshire 
Mercury reprinted the following: 
 
What is a News-paper? When under the direction of a prudent, 
experienced conductor, it is a centinel placed upon the out-posts of the 
constitution, and should never be punished but for sleeping or neglect of 
duty. The freedom of thinking, speaking, and writing is one of the great 
principles of liberty, and a news-paper is by far the most eligible medium 
for men to convey their opinions to the public ear.306 
 
The editorial went on to covey the roles of a free press, including checking the 
monarchy, ministers, and senators.307 It was not the only one. On November 20, 
1790, the Independent Gazetteer published an editorial on how newspapers were 
the medium by which the people informed the representatives of their wishes and 
the representatives gained the support of the people: 
 
It is with great reason that the English boast of the liberty of the press, 
and regard it as the palladium or safe-guard of their civil liberty. . . . The 
liberty of the press is also favorable to those popular assemblies so 
necessary in a free state; for the newspapers inform the public of the 
time, the place, and generally the object of those meetings, which they 
detail in particular manner to the whole nation. In them every one enjoys 
the most entire liberty of speech; the Members of Parliament themselves, 
who often go to them, sometimes find matters better discussed there than 
in either House of Parliament. The statesmen whose measure have been 
disapproved, there find free access; there they employ their friend and 
their credit, and bring all the arts they are masters of into play to gain the 
people to their interests.308 
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Certainly this historical evidence reveals that newspapers were seen as 
something more than just some technological innovation to convey free speech. 
Throughout the eighteenth century they became known as the customary means by 
which information was relayed. The utility of the press—as both an entity and an 
invention—guaranteed liberty.309 An April 15, 1774 editorial in the Massachusetts 
Spy perfectly captures this understanding of a free press for “the public”: 
 
It has with justness been frequently remarked by some of the most 
eminent patriots in the British dominions, and especially by some in this 
province, that the liberty of the press is one of the greatest privileges we 
can enjoy; and is that, which, every true Englishman will ever try to 
support at the risque of all that is dear to him. I suppose the utility of the 
press consists in this, viz. that as long as tyrannical usurpers are not 
entirely beyond a blush, an exhibition of the injustice of their conduct, to 
the public, may possibly have some tendency to reclaim them; Or to 
encourage the oppressed to oppose them, and publish to the world the 
illegality and wickedness of what they oppose. One or the other of these 
points, I apprehend, is what various writers for American liberty 
constantly aim at.310 
 
In terms of constitutional utility, the significance of newspapers was also 
pronounced in opposition to the 1785 Massachusetts Stamp Act. The Act imposed 
a two-penny tax for every copy of a newspaper or almanac. The tax was repealed 
the same year and was then replaced with a tax on advertisements, which remained 
in force for two years amidst heavy protest and little revenue.311 The newspaper 
editorials concerning it reveal how printers viewed themselves as maintainers of a 
free press. For instance, the Hampshire Herald published an editorial claiming that 
the “detestable tax” sought to place “a curb on free discussion” and impede a free 
press.312 The editorial stated, “It is universally agreed, that the utility of 
newspapers to the common people, and of course to the majority by far of the 
community, arises, from, or is at least wonderfully enlarged and diffused by 
[newspapers’] cheapness.”313 Thus, the thrust of the argument was that any tax on 
newspapers would raise the price as to “exclude” the “body of the people” from the 
“benefit of the press.”314 
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The Massachusetts Centinel published a similar editorial, claiming a “Stamp 
on news-papers, can be considered in not other light, than as a stab to the freedom 
of the people.”315 It was deemed the people’s “invaluable privilege, to know 
everything that is transacting, to examine for themselves, and publickly to express 
their sentiments respecting it” through the press.316 The Stamp Act was viewed as 
impeding that freedom: 
 
By the publick print—By that sacred palladium of freedom, a free press, 
we are informed of the situation of our comm[ittee], and when our great 
men behave unworthy, and sometimes we are awakened from the very 
brink of destruction—Every measure then that has the most minute 
tendency to prevent, suppress, or restrain the publick papers, or the 
liberty of the press, is repugnant to the constitution.317 
 
Lastly, Isaiah Thomas, the printer and editor of the Massachusetts Spy, took 
the virtuous stance of discontinuing his newspaper until the Stamp Act was 
repealed.318 Thomas emphasized the role that a free press played in the American 
Revolution and could not see how such a “tax on News-Papers comports” with the 
Massachusetts Constitution.319 His rationale being that any law “which takes away 
the means of printing and circulating News-Papers” was an “unconstitutional 
restraint on the Liberty of the Press.”320 
Given these affirmations of the utility of newspapers in effectuating a free 
press, it is difficult to argue that the liberty of the press was limited to the invention 
of printing. The liberty of the press was something greater. It was held out to be 
one of the “great and fundamental principles of a free government” along with 
“liberty of conscience, trial by juries, . . . annual elections, and the division and 
rotation of offices.”321 As early as 1774, in requesting an alliance with Quebec, the 
Continental Congress stressed the importance of the “Freedom of the Press.”322 
Probably borrowing from early eighteenth-century English writers, Congress 
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stressed that a free press advances “truth, science, morality, and arts in general,” as 
well as diffuses “liberal sentiments on the administration of Government.”323 It 
was of such importance that Congress described the freedom of the press as one of 
five “invaluable rights that form a considerable part of our mild system of 
Government.”324 Two years later, Congress would again instruct their Canada 
peace delegation—Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Chase, and Charles Carroll—to 
establish there a “free Press,” which would frequently publish “such pieces as may 
be of service to the cause of the United Colonies.”325 These instructions came three 
months before the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, thus affirming the 
crucial role a free press played in the American Revolution and the development of 
our state republican governments. 
 
V.  THE HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION’S PRESS CLAUSE  
AS INTERFACE TO THE PRESENT AND FUTURE 
 
In 1777, David Hume highlighted the constitutional significance of a free 
press in his work Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary. He believed that all 
mixed governments required “foregoing observation” through the “liberty of the 
press.”326 In other words, a free press served to check “arbitrary power” and 
provided an “easy method of conveying the alarm from one end of the kingdom to 
the other.”327 It ensured the “spirit of the people” could be aroused “in order to 
curb the ambition” of government.328 The founding generation viewed a free press 
in much the same light through newspapers. They were the founders’ easy method 
of alarming the people. 
In terms of the actual constitutional debates, little can be garnered concerning 
the constitutional breadth of the Press Clause.329 This fact, however, does not 
detract from the significance placed on including a free press in the Bill of Rights. 
The mention of the press was not something just added in the list of First 
Amendment rights, but was arguably the gravitas of the amendment itself. The 
writings of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison confirm this historical fact. 
Beginning with the former, in 1802 Jefferson wrote to Joseph Priestly to 
correct any notion that Jefferson, “more than any other individual,” had “planned 
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and established” the Constitution.330 Jefferson confirmed the fact that he was in 
“Europe when the Constitution was planned and established, and never saw it till 
after it was established.”331 The only contribution Jefferson could claim was the 
push for a Bill of Rights: 
 
On receiving it I wrote strongly to Mr. Madison, urging the want of 
provision for the freedom of religion, freedom of the press, trial by jury, 
habeas corpus, the substitution of militia for a standing army, and an 
express reservation to the States, of all rights not specifically granted to 
the Union. [Madison] accordingly moved, in the first session of Congress 
for these amendments, which were agreed to and ratified by the States  
as they now stand. This all the hand I had in what related to  
the Constitution.332 
 
Jefferson’s request for a right protecting the “freedom of the press” was one 
of only six suggestions, with the “freedom of religion” being the only other First 
Amendment item included.333 Perhaps what is most intriguing about Jefferson’s 
1802 letter is that his memory served him correct. Frequently, when a person 
recollects past events there are historical inconsistencies, but this was not so for 
Jefferson. His memory was rather exact and on point, for example, in a letter dated 
December 20, 1787, Jefferson indeed urged Madison to include the press in the 
Bill of Rights: 
 
There are other good things [in the Constitution] of less moment. I will 
now tell you what I do not like. First, the omission of a bill of rights, 
providing clearly, and without the aid of sophism, for freedom of 
religion, freedom of the press, protection against standing armies, 
restriction of monopolies, the eternal and unremitting force of habeas 
corpus laws, and trials by jury in all matters of fact triable by the laws of 
the land, and not by the laws of nations.334 
 
Jefferson was just one of numerous founders to push for a free press; 
therefore, it is impossible to peg him as influencing Madison to include it.335 Given 
Madison’s notes, however, we do know that Madison believed the freedom of the 
press to be instrumental in the new republic. He annotated that the freedom of the 
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press was not included in the 1689 Declaration of Rights, Magna Charta, or 
Petition of Rights.336 Yet this lack of an English constitutional guidepost did not 
stop Madison from using the freedom as a reason to argue the Bill of Rights was 
“ergo proper.”337 
Even if evidence of Jefferson and Madison’s need to include the press in the 
Bill of Rights is inconclusive, the debates undoubtedly confirm the constitutional 
significance of the liberty of the press.338 For one, the debates show that the 
encouragement of a free press was vital to all republican governments.339 It is also 
apparent that the founding generation often referred to it as the palladium or 
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I could have wished, sir, that a greater caution had been used to secure to 
us the freedom of election, a sufficient and responsible representation, the 
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foundation can any man lay, which will secure the sacred temple of freedom 
against the power of the great, the undermining arts of ambition, and the blasts 
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bulwark of liberty, indicating its interrelation with government.340 Undoubtedly, 
this palladium not only rested with the people being able to write and publish their 
sentiments without prior restraint, but also with the press as an entity.341 
While the Constitution’s debates do not illuminate or confirm the 
constitutional utility of newspapers in this regard, a contemporaneous 1790 debate 
in the First Congress does.342 The debate concerned whether Congress should 
provide its members with newspapers at the public expense and whether it should 
confine the printing of congressional debates to a few select printers.343 This debate 
confirms that the press, particularly newspaper media, was seen as the medium 
through which the people could obtain a wealth of public information. The 
government often facilitated this information itself through the publishing of laws, 
resolutions, and proceedings.344 
Before recreating the debate, it is important to point out that there are two 
accounts of this short, yet important exchange. The Gazette of the United States 
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published one account and the New-York Daily Gazette published the other, both 
of which were published in New York.345 Each account varies in language, but 
both confirm the constitutional utility of newspapers. For purposes of recreating 
that debate, the New-York Daily Gazette’s account provides the most detail, 
conveying the views of Eldridge Gerry, William L. Smith, and John Page. 
Meanwhile, the Gazette of the United States provides the most detailed account of 
the views of Egbert Benson and Roger Sherman. 
Eldridge Gerry started the debate by objecting to the measure that would limit 
publishing congressional debates to select printers. He believed such a measure 
would lead to the “discontinuance of the newspapers.”346 Gerry stated newspapers 
were the “means” that “knowledge of public measures is generally diffused 
throughout the union,” and argued that the citizens in “distant parts” have as “good 
a right to such information as those who are near Congress.”347 Indeed, newspapers 
sometimes made “misrepresentations” of congressional debates.348 However, Gerry 
thought Congress needed to encourage the press as an industry, for newspapers 
“now print freely on both sides of every question”: 
 
[If the] debates will be confined to the papers of one or two printers of 
Congress, who will be under the influence of the members, and these 
forming a faction, may misrepresent the conduct of particular members, 
and make any impressions they please for misleading the public . . . that 
the state of politics in the several states, and much useful information on 
subjects under the consideration of Congress, were obtained by the 
papers; and as he conceived that the public could not be too well 
informed of the measures of Congress . . . .349 
 
Gerry reminded his fellow Congressmen that it was through their “liberal 
encouragement” that printers established the “freedom of the press, which was 
essential to liberty.”350 John Page agreed that Congress should not show any 
“partiality” to respective printers.351 It was important to “encourage them 
generally.”352 Certainly misrepresentations and mistakes would occur, but Page felt 
this was a self-correcting evil given the “good disposition amongst the printers to 
correct them.”353 
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Roger Sherman concurred because he felt that printers had “always aimed to 
be impartial.”354 Furthermore, Sherman argued, “it was for their interest to be so; it 
is true [printers] are liable to commit errors, and some have been printed in the 
debates, but when they have been pointed out, they were willing to publish 
corrections, and in many cases have done it.”355 Meanwhile William L. Smith 
expanded on the constitutional utility of newspapers, stating: 
 
[T]he publication of newspapers, and their extensive circulation, ought to 
receive every possible encouragement from Congress: they were a useful 
vehicle for conveying valuable intelligence from the seat of government 
to the remotest parts of the continent. Many of the citizens, from their 
particular stations of life, had few other modes of obtaining information, 
and were obliged therefore to derive it from this source. From 
newspapers they acquired a knowledge of the proceedings of the 
government; and should Congress take any step at this time, which might 
in any manner tend to check their circulation, such a measure would 
carry with it an improper aspect. . . . [Not to mention,] newspapers [are] 
beneficial to the community in another respect; they formed a sort of 
bond of union among the different states, by transmitting reciprocal 
information from one to the other.356 
 
Regarding the subject of the United States paying for its members’ newspaper 
subscriptions, Egbert Benson viewed the custom as only a means to ensure the 
former Confederation Congress remained punctual;357 an observation that did not 
gain any support.358 Eldridge Gerry conceded to Benson that each member could 
pay the cost. He thought the expense to the United States was small, however, 
when compared to the “great benefit” it provided.359 He also wondered whether 
this new policy would lessen public information transmitted between the  
several states.360 
Roger Sherman replied to Gerry that he thought this last conclusion was 
overstated. Sherman argued that the dissemination of information in newspapers 
was not so much from the “members sending the papers to their constituents,” as 
much as “the republications which took place in consequence of the printers 
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sending their papers to each other.”361 In response to the United States paying for 
the newspapers, Sherman remained neutral so long as the newspapers were not 
read during sessions of Congress. 
In the end, the House of Representatives voted against employing select 
printers, but voted in favor of providing a variety of state newspapers at the 
expense of the United States. As the debates reveal, the constitutional utility 
afforded to an open and free press outweighed any interest of preventing 
misrepresentations. The industry of newspapers, it was believed, was self-
correcting. Similar to John Toland and other early English press advocates,362 the 
First Congress viewed the press as a pendulum of truth that corrected falsehoods. 
This constitutional utility also included the assurance of divergent views on 
important subjects. In the words of William L. Smith, if congressmen supplied 
their own papers “each member would give the preference to some particular 
paper, which would be a discouragement to the others.”363 
A number of editorials contemporaneous with the adoption of the Constitution 
also confirm the constitutional utility of newspapers in facilitating the free press.364 
Each conveys that the press, as an entity, was just as constitutionally significant as 
the right of individuals to write and publish their sentiments. To be clear, 
consistent with the historical record preceding the adoption of the Constitution,365 
there is substantiated evidence to show that printers viewed themselves as an 
integral cog in the freedom of the press. Take for instance Andrew Brown of the 
Federal Gazette and Philadelphia Daily Advertiser, who assured his readership: 
 
[In order to publish] such articles of domestic, and foreign intelligence, 
as, are calculated to disseminate useful information, or gratify rational 
curiosity, I shall, therefore, endeavor to add, an early, a concise and a 
faithful abstract of the proceedings and debates of the federal, as well as 
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the state, legislature. From this source, the freedom of the press pours its 
noblest stream.366 
 
Brown made it clear to his patrons that his paper sought to “obtain applause 
rather for the utility, than the quantity, of the information” it supplied.367 He took 
great pride in his newspaper’s “accuracy, diligence, and impartiality.”368 
Furthermore, to emphasize the importance of newspapers in general, Brown 
included a personal recommendation signed by the likes of political figures 
Thomas Mifflin, Robert Morris, and Tench Coxe, reading, “Newspapers are in all 
countries, but especially free ones, of importance. When conducted with decency 
and industry, they are the vehicles of much pleasing and useful intelligence to 
ever[y] order of society.”369 
A few other editorials contemporaneous with the adoption of the Constitution 
convey the constitutional utility of newspapers in a free press. In the Gazette of the 
United States, an editorial claimed that the “adoption of the Federal Constitution” 
would not have been possible without the “Freedom of the Press,” an “event 
unparalleled in the annals of mankind.”370 At the time, this was an astute 
observation. It was firmly believed that the “independency and free state of the 
press” in the community offered “degrees of freedom of safety,” which affected 
“publick men, and publick measures.”371 
Before the inclusion of the Bill of Rights, another editorial in the New York 
Daily Gazette commented on the lack of a provision ensuring the freedom of the 
press. It described the freedom as “not only a noble right of individual citizens, but 
also an excellent means to enlighten, refrain, animate, and improve the 
government.”372 The means inferred the constitutional utility of printers in 
disseminating useful and periodic information in newspapers. The circulation and 
reliability of their contents were viewed as vital to the new Republic. As the 
anonymous Philadelphiensis wrote: 
 
In America the freedom of the press is peculiarly interesting: to a people 
scattered over such a vast continent, what means of information or 
redress have they, when a conspiracy has been formed against their 
sacred rights and privileges? None but the press. This is the herald that 
sounds the alarm, and rouses freemen to guard their liberty. . . . And 
                                                          
366
 CITY GAZETTE, OR THE DAILY ADVERTISER (Charleston, S.C.), Nov. 27, 1790,  
at 4, col. 2. 
367 Id. 
368 Id. 
369 Id. col. 3. 
370
 GAZETTE U.S. (N.Y.C.), Apr. 15, 1789, at 4, col. 2. 
371 Id. 
372
 N.Y. DAILY GAZETTE, June 16, 1789, at 2, col. 2. 
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through the medium of the press, the good and the patriotic citizen 
receives the thanks of his grateful countrymen.373 
 
It is perhaps possible to substitute every instance of the founding generation’s 
reference to the utility of “the press” and “newspapers” with the phrase 
“technological medium to publish.” This, however, would provide a historical 
disservice to the intellectual history concerning what the Press Clause embodied. 
Indeed, although playing textual word games with eighteenth-century punctuation 
and the different state constitutional provisions could result in a different 
interpretation of free press, this too detracts from the customary origins of a free 
press. It is a historical point of emphasis that there is no evidence to suggest the 
founding generation viewed the phrase “freedom of the press” any different from 
the phrases “liberty of the press” or “free press.” The phrases were used 
interchangeably from the late seventeenth century through the adoption of the 
Constitution, which emphasizes how untenable it is to rely on textual wordplay and 
dictionaries to ascertain constitutional meaning.374 
Too often legal scholars turn to these interpretational approaches when 
deducing original meaning, original understanding, or whatever the respective 
originalist wishes to dub his form of interpretation. To date, not one historian or 
legal scholar has shown that the founding generation frequently cited to, relied on, 
referenced, or walked around with the dictionaries of Samuel Johnson375 or 
Timothy Cunningham when interpreting eighteenth-century constitutions, federal 
or state.376 The legal principles embodied by constitutional provisions are best 
                                                          
373
 FREEMAN’S J. (Phila.), Jan. 23, 1788, at 2, col. 3 (first emphasis added). 
374 This does not prevent prominent originalists from taking this approach, which is 
detrimental to constitutional interpretation. For some examples of improperly using Samuel 
Johnson’s dictionary, see Randy Barnett, The Origins of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 101, 113–14 (2001); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, 
Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Approach to Justice Scalia, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1016–17 (2007); Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The 
“Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 245 
(2005); Randy Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an 
Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237, 255–56 (2004) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER 
& WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002)). 
375 Historical problems that arise with the use of Samuel Johnson’s dictionary are 
political biases and viewpoints. For an intriguing study of Johnson’s political bias, see 
Robert DeMaria, Jr., The Politics of Johnson’s Dictionary, 104 PMLA 64, 64–74 (1989). 
376 For anyone seeking to use the aid of a legal dictionary to ascertain eighteenth-
century original meaning, we recommend tracing the word or legal principle through the 
different editions of Giles Jacob’s The Law-Dictionary. Editions were published 
throughout the eighteenth century, and the first American edition comprised six volumes. 
See 1 GILES JACOB, THE LAW-DICTIONARY (T.E. Tomlins ed., N.Y.C., I. Riley, & P. 
Byrne, 1st Am. ed. 1811). Thus, Giles Jacob’s dictionary shows additions or modifications 
to a legal term or premise through time. For an example of the use of Giles Jacob’s 
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deduced through accepted historical methodologies, particularly intellectual and 
social history. 
The hidden danger in substituting proper historical methodologies with textual 
approaches can be summed up in terms of legal repercussions. For instance, in 
preemption cases the Supreme Court frequently relies on the tools of textualism, 
including the use of dictionaries, to determine congressional purpose.377 In such 
cases, should the Court misunderstand congressional intent, a majority of Congress 
may remedy the disparity by amending the law—a minor repercussion. But in 
cases concerning the Constitution, a misunderstanding of constitutional text 
essentially amends the Constitution. The principles of stare decisis can hinder the 
Supreme Court from overruling or expanding on that decision.378 Thus, in such 
constitutional cases it may require the people to amend the Constitution itself, 
which has proven quite difficult in the past half century. 
Hopefully, should the Supreme Court reinvigorate the Press Clause, it will not 
solely resort to textualist approaches.379 The Court should rely on the Press 
Clause’s evolving customary origins based upon the principles of utility that the 
founding generation understood. This does not supersede the historical pedigree of 
the people’s right to think, write, and publish their sentiments380 consistent with the 
laws concerning libel.381 The First Amendment undoubtedly protects such a right. 
                                                          
dictionary to understand the evolution of the law, see Patrick J. Charles, “Arms for Their 
Defence”?: An Historical, Legal, and Textual Analysis of the English Right to Have Arms 
and Whether the Second Amendment Should Be Incorporated in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 357 n.30 (2009). 
377 For a recent example, see Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 
1978, 1988 (2011). 
378 For a great discussion on the role of stare decisis, see Lawrence B. Solum, The 
Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future 
of Enumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155 (2006). 
379 Although this Article and historians in general do not agree with this approach, it 
is worth noting that a pure textualist approach supports unique press protections. See West, 
supra note 19, at 1033–41 (arguing solely on the textual structure of the Constitution). 
380 See generally Amar, supra note 18 (conveying concerns with affording “the press” 
distinct protections not afforded to the general “people”). 
381 As understood by the founding generation, governments could prescribe any laws 
restricting the freedom of the press to prevent a breach of the peace—including preventing 
murders and revenge. See 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (Oxford), supra note 285, at 
150–51; Trial for Libel, CONCORD HERALD, Apr. 6, 1791, at 1, col. 3 (statement of Judge 
Israel Sumner) (stating that freedom of the press does not include those activities that 
“undermine the very principles of freedom, and strike[] at the foundation of the publick 
peace and happiness”); William Mainwaring, Charge to the Grand Jury Delivered to the 
County of Middlesex, Dec. 10, 1792, in CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY 1689–1803, supra 
note 64, at 451, 452 (“The Liberty of the Press is one of the glorious Privileges of 
Englishmen—it is essential to the Liberty of the Subject, to the Existence of a free State, 
while exercised for lawful and just Purposes; but when it is made use of as the Instrument 
of Slander and Detraction, to destroy the Comfort and Happiness of Individuals, or to 
disturb the Harmony and good Order of the State . . . it becomes the most mischievous and 
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But this is not the only protection the Press Clause affords. There are also basic 
press entity rights that originate in the founding era as well. 
This leaves open the question: What protections should the Press Clause offer 
that it does not already protect? Using the founding era as a historical guidepost, a 
free press maintained the right to acquire and print information on matters of 
public concern. Naturally, this excludes issues requiring secrecy or national 
security,382 but Sonja R. West’s view that the Press Clause should provide 
protections for “information gathering” is historically sound.383 The constitutional 
utility that the founding generation placed on receiving and disseminating 
information is too strong to ignore. The Anglo origins of the liberty of the press 
confirm it. Early seventeenth-century advocates understood that the truth would 
self-correct while being processed in the public discourse—a pendulum of truth,  
so to speak.384 
At the same time, this does not completely negate Volokh’s thesis either. 
There may have been only one printing technology available in the eighteenth 
century, but the utility of receiving and disseminating information requires that any 
free press protections evolve with the technology to facilitate it. This does not 
mean that any and every person who blogs or publishes his thoughts falls under the 
embodiment of a free press. Indeed, the Press Clause protects an individual’s right 
to publish without prior restraint, but the general person does not maintain the 
industrial credibility to disseminate useful information to the community. 
The following sections discuss these issues in more detail. In line with the 
founding generation’s views on the public utility385 of a free press, the following 
                                                          
destructive Engine . . . .”); Thomas McKean, Charge to the Grand Jury Delivered Before 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on November 27, 1797, reprinted in TIMES: 
ALEXANDRIA ADVERTISER (Alexandria, Va.), Dec. 11, 1797, at 2, col. 1 (limiting the 
freedom of the press to “decent, candid and true [publications] . . . for the purpose of 
reformation, and not of defamation; [so] that they have an eye solely on the public good”). 
It is questionable whether the Supreme Court’s current First Amendment doctrine comports 
with this view. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1211, 1216–17 (2011). 
382 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 7 (“The Congress of the 
United States . . . shall publish the Journal of their proceedings monthly, except such parts 
thereof relating to treaties, alliances or military operations, as in their judgement require 
secrecy.”); New York Ratification of the Constitution, IMPARTIAL GAZETTEER, & 
SATURDAY EVENING’S POST (N.Y.C.), Aug. 2, 1788, at 2, col. 2 (“That the Journals of 
Congress shall be published at least once a year, with the exception of such parts relating to 
treaties of military operations, as in the judgment of either house shall require secrecy; and 
that both houses of Congress shall always keep their doors open during their sessions, 
unless the business may in their opinion require secrecy.”). 
383 West, supra note 19, at 1057. 
384 See supra Part II. 
385 Perhaps Pennsylvania Judge Alexander Addison summed up the link between 
“virtue” and “public utility” best, writing: 
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sections will address the problems with current Press Clause jurisprudence, and 
how to correct these problems moving forward. 
 
VI.  CURRENT PRESS CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE VIEWED  
THROUGH THE LENS OF HISTORY 
 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Press Clause is sharply at odds with 
the historical findings outlined above.386 The Court has consistently refused to give 
the Press Clause any independent significance.387 The Court decided all of the 
great victories for press freedom, including New York Times Co. v. Sullivan388 and 
                                                          
To produce virtue or public utility is the true end of government. Virtue is 
most effectually produced, by making it the interest of each individual to 
promote the public good. That form of government must be good which 
necessarily combines the individual with the general interest, and that form of 
government must be bad which necessarily disjoins them. That therefore must 
be the best form of government which most effectually and inseparably 
combines and unites the general and individual interest, and this is most 
effectually done in a democratic republic. 
 
ALEXANDER ADDISON, CHARGE TO GRAND JURIES OF THE COUNTIES OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
IN THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 93 (Phila., Kay & Brother 1883). For the importance of 
Alexander Addison in American constitutional jurisprudence, see Patrick J. Charles, 
Originalism, John Marshall, and the Necessary and Proper Clause: Resurrecting the 
Jurisprudence of Alexander Addison, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 529, 529–74 (2010). 
386 A number of important articles have pointed out the inconsistencies with the 
Supreme Court’s use and abuse of history. See Julius Goebel, Jr., Constitutional History 
and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 555 (1938) (discussing the use of history for 
constitutional interpretation); Mitchell Gordon, Adjusting the Rear-View Mirror: 
Rethinking the Use of History in Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 475, 
538–40 (2006); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. 
REV. 119; Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court’s 
Uses of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809, 809 (1997); Robert M. Spector, Legal Historian on the 
United States Supreme Court: Justice Horace Gray, Jr., and the Historical Method, 12 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 181, 181 (1968). 
387 See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978) (rejecting the notion 
that the Press Clause affords the news media any greater protection from search and seizure 
than it does for other citizens); First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797–801 (1978) 
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (dictum) (rejecting the notion that the Press Clause affords any 
special protection to the institutional press); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833–34 (1974) 
(rejecting the notion that the Press Clause affords journalists any greater right of access to 
prisons than that enjoyed by the public generally); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,  
690–91 (1972) (rejecting the notion that the Press Clause affords reporters any greater 
protection from grand jury subpoenas than it does for other citizens). 
388 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (reversing a $500,000 libel award to a Southern official who, 
following a clash with civil rights demonstrators, identified certain factual inaccuracies in 
an advertisement the demonstrators published in The New York Times recounting the event; 
the Supreme Court here established qualified protection for defamatory falsehoods uttered 
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the Pentagon Papers case,389 under the Speech Clause, not the Press Clause. Under 
the Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment, the press enjoys no special 
power or privilege to gather information,390 the press enjoys no greater right of 
access to government information or proceedings than that enjoyed by the general 
public,391 and the press enjoys no special immunity from governmental demands 
for information in its possession.392 
Perhaps the most thoughtful discussion of the Press Clause ever penned by a 
Supreme Court justice appears not in a judicial decision but in a law review article: 
Potter Stewart’s Or of the Press.393 When Justice Stewart wrote it, the press had 
just concluded an epic duel with President Richard Nixon, investigating and 
                                                          
by critics of official conduct); id. at 279–80 (holding that public officials are precluded 
from recovering damages for such statements unless they can prove that the statement was 
uttered “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of [its truth]”). 
389 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (striking down injunctions 
that barred the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing excerpts from the 
“Pentagon Papers,” a top secret Defense Department study of the Vietnam War). 
390 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707, 727–28 (1972) (acknowledging that 
“news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,” but rejecting a broad 
right to gather news proposed by Justice Stewart in dissent); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 
817 (1974) (rejecting a Press Clause challenge to a California penal provision that barred 
face-to-face interviews between a reporter and any individual inmate whom the reporter 
specifically named and requested); id. at 833–34 (“It has generally been held that the First 
Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to 
information not available to the public generally. . . . Despite the fact that news gathering 
may be hampered, the press is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, [the 
Supreme Court’s] own conferences, the meetings of other official bodies gathering in 
executive session, and the meetings of private organizations. Newsmen have no 
constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is 
excluded.” (first alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation  
marks omitted)). 
391 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1980) (invoking 
the Speech, Press, Assembly, and Petition Clauses of the First Amendment, in 
combination, to support a broad public “right to know” about governmental proceedings, 
the Court recognized a general right of public and press access to criminal trials—but the 
press enjoys only that degree of access possessed by the public generally). 
392 Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 547 (1978) (upholding unannounced police raid and search of 
student newspaper’s offices, where police had a warrant to search for photographs of 
student protesters who assaulted police while seizing control of administrative offices of 
university hospital—holding that so long as a police search satisfies the Fourth 
Amendment, the First Amendment affords the news media no special protection from 
search and seizure); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665 (holding that reporters can be compelled to 
disclose their investigative findings and the identities of their confidential sources when 
subpoenaed to testify before grand juries, with no offense to the First Amendment). 
393 See Stewart, supra note 23. 
1756 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
 
exposing the Watergate affair, which resulted in Nixon’s resignation.394 Focusing 
on “the role of the organized press—of the daily newspapers and other established 
news media—in the system of government our Constitution created,” Justice 
Stewart asserted that “investigative reporting [by] an adversary press” is “precisely 
the function” intended for the press “by those who wrote the First Amendment.”395 
Specifically citing Nixon’s fall from office, he argued that when the press serves as 
a government watchdog—“exposing official wrongdoing at the highest levels of 
our national government”—it is playing a constitutional role envisioned by the 
Press Clause.396 Invoking the separation of powers as a structural feature of the 
Constitution, one that creates checks and balances among the three branches of 
government, Justice Stewart argued that the Press Clause likewise operates as “a 
structural provision,”397 whose “primary purpose” was “to create a fourth 
institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three official 
branches.”398 As the Press Clause envisioned, this “Fourth Estate” would be more 
than “just a neutral vehicle for the balanced discussion of diverse ideas.”399 
Instead, it would offer “organized, expert scrutiny of government.”400 
A government watchdog providing organized, expert scrutiny of public 
officials—this is a role for the press that comports quite closely with the historical 
                                                          
394 DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE POWERS THAT BE 702 (1979). President Nixon resigned 
from office on August 9, 1974. Id. 
395 Stewart, supra note 23, at 631. 
396 Id. Differentiating between the Speech and Press Clauses, Justice Stewart 
observed: 
 
It is tempting to suggest that freedom of the press means only that 
newspaper publishers are guaranteed freedom of expression. They are 
guaranteed that freedom, to be sure, but so are we all, because of the Free 
Speech Clause. If the Free Press guarantee meant no more than freedom of 
expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy. 
 
Id. at 633. 
397 Id. at 633. 
398 Id. at 634. 
399 Id. Focusing on the constitutional role of the press, Justice Stewart observed: 
 
It is also a mistake to suppose that the only purpose of the [Press Clause] is 
to insure that a newspaper will serve as a neutral forum for debate, a “market 
place of ideas,” a kind of Hyde Park corner for the community. A related theory 
sees the press as a neutral conduit of information between the people and their 
elected leaders. These theories, in my view, again give insufficient weight to the 
institutional autonomy of the press that it was the purpose of the Constitution to 
guarantee. 
 
Id. 
400 Id. 
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findings set forth in this Article. But as a basis for interpreting the Press Clause, 
this view has never captured a Supreme Court majority. 
Three years after the appearance of Justice Stewart’s article, Chief Justice 
Warren Burger offered a response in First National Bank v. Bellotti.401 Though 
Chief Justice Burger never mentions Justice Stewart by name and never cites 
Justice Stewart’s law review article, he is responding directly to “[t]hose [who] 
interpret[] the Press Clause [as] creating a special role for the ‘institutional 
press.’”402 Staking out a position that has since become the Court’s longstanding 
majority view, the Chief Justice argued that the Press Clause is essentially 
synonymous with the Speech Clause, that the Press Clause confers no special 
status or privilege upon the news media, and that the press enjoys no greater 
freedom from governmental restraint than any other speaker.403 
Chief Justice Burger offered two basic reasons for his interpretation of the 
Press Clause: (1) the history of the Clause does not suggest that the Framers 
contemplated a special role for the press;404 and (2) in our modern era, there are 
insuperable difficulties in defining the institutional press.405 
The Chief Justice’s first reason—that there is “no supporting evidence”406 that 
the Framers envisioned a special role for the press—is refuted by the historical 
findings set forth in this Article. 
His second reason—the difficulty of defining the institutional press—is 
probably a greater problem today, given the explosion of blogging,407 than it was in 
1978 when the Court decided Bellotti. For Chief Justice Burger, the key problem in 
defining the press was “[t]he evolution of traditional newspapers into modern 
corporate conglomerates in which the daily dissemination of news by print is no 
longer the major part of the whole enterprise.”408 “Corporate ownership,” he 
observed, “may extend, vertically, to pulp mills and pulp timberlands to insure an 
adequate, continuing supply of newsprint and to trucking and steamship lines for 
                                                          
401 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invoking the Speech Clause to strike down a Massachusetts 
statute making it a crime for banks and business corporations to spend or contribute money 
to influence voters on any ballot measure not affecting the corporation’s property, business, 
or assets). Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion in Bellotti; Chief Justice Burger made 
independent observations on the Press Clause. Id. at 795–803 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
Chief Justice Burger’s remarks on the Press Clause are all dictum because the 
Massachusetts statute at issue did not restrict the news media. But it did impose a ban on 
corporate speech—and the Chief Justice, noting the existence of large media 
conglomerates, wrote separately to address the Press Clause implications of restricting 
speech of media corporations. Id. at 796. 
402 Id. at 799 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
403 Id. at 798–802. 
404 Id. at 798–801. 
405 Id. at 801–02. 
406 Id. at 799. 
407 See Paul Horwitz, “Or of the [Blog],” 11 NEXUS 45, 45 (2006). 
408 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 802 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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the purpose of transporting the newsprint to the presses.”409 Today, two 
simultaneous trends exacerbate this definitional problem: the concentration of 
media ownership in the hands of a few gigantic companies, and the 
decentralization of reporting through cable television and the Internet.410 But the 
difficulty of defining the press can hardly justify the Court’s refusal to give 
independent significance to the Press Clause. The difficulty of defining due 
process has not deterred the Court from finding both procedural and substantive 
protections in that constitutional clause.411 In our Conclusion, we will return to the 
problem of defining the press. 
In the years surrounding Bellotti, the Supreme Court issued a series of rulings 
that transformed Chief Justice Burger’s reading of the Press Clause from dictum412 
to precedent. Two cases—Branzburg v. Hayes413 and Zurcher v. Stanford 
Daily414—upheld the government’s power to pry information from reporters’ hands 
through grand jury subpoenas and search warrants, respectively. 
In Branzburg, a newspaper reporter in Louisville, Kentucky, was subpoenaed 
to reveal the identities of confidential news sources for a series of articles he had 
written on illegal drug activity. In performing his investigative work, the reporter 
interviewed several dozen illegal drug users, who spoke to him only on condition 
that he conceal their identities.415 After the publication of these stories, the reporter 
                                                          
409 Id. at 796. 
410 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN: A FREE PRESS 
FOR A NEW CENTURY 53 (2010) (“The definitional problem—who constitutes ‘the press’—
has seemed intractable.”). 
411 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
§ 7.1, at 557–58 (4th ed. 2011) (explaining the distinction between procedural and 
substantive due process). 
412 See supra note 401 and accompanying text (explaining why Chief Justice Burger’s 
concurrence in Bellotti was dictum). 
413 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that reporters can be compelled to disclose their 
investigative findings and the identities of their confidential sources when subpoenaed to 
testify before grand juries, with no offense to the First Amendment). 
414 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (upholding unannounced police raid and search of student 
newspaper’s offices, where police had a warrant to search for photographs of student 
protesters who assaulted police while seizing control of administrative offices of university 
hospital—holding that so long as a police search satisfies the Fourth Amendment, the First 
Amendment affords the news media no special protection from search and seizure). 
415 Paul Branzburg was a staff reporter for a newspaper called the Louisville Courier-
Journal. He published some feature stories on illegal drug activity. One story focused on 
two young men who were synthesizing hashish and thereby earning $5,000 over a three-
week span. The other story resulted from a two-week investigation into widespread drug 
use occurring in Frankfort, Kentucky. The story involved the reporter in interviews with 
several dozen drug users. Branzburg was able to get these people to talk to him by 
promising not to reveal their identities in the newspaper stories he would publish about 
them. And Branzburg kept his promise; he published these stories without revealing the 
identities of his subjects. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667–71. 
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found himself subpoenaed to testify before the county grand jury.416 When he 
refused to answer questions about the identities of his subjects, he was held in 
contempt of court.417 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear his appeal—but in a 
5–4 ruling, it handed him a defeat.418 
Writing for the majority, Justice White flatly refused to recognize a 
reporter/news source privilege emanating from the Press Clause. He asserted that 
nothing in the First Amendment immunizes a reporter from the duty to appear and 
answer questions, like any other citizen, in response to a grand jury subpoena.419 
Suggesting that many confidential informants seek anonymity to “escape criminal 
prosecution,”420 he declared, “[W]e cannot seriously entertain the notion that the 
First Amendment protects a newsman’s agreement to conceal the criminal conduct 
of his source . . . on the theory that it is better to write about crime than to do 
something about it.”421 Finally, like Chief Justice Burger in Bellotti, he recoiled at 
the difficulty of defining “those categories of newsmen who qualif[y] for the 
privilege.”422 He exaggerated that difficulty by lumping reporters together with 
“lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists”—
professing to find them indistinguishable under the Press Clause because they all 
“contribut[e] to the flow of information to the public.”423 
In a dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Stewart urged 
the Court to give independent significance to the Press Clause, expressly 
recognizing a right to gather news and a corresponding privilege for confidential 
communications between a reporter and his source.424 By leaving reporters with no 
privilege by which to protect their sources, he argued, the majority opinion “invites 
state and federal authorities to undermine the historic independence of the press  
by attempting to annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm  
of government.”425 
The true holding of Branzburg remains ambiguous because Justice Lewis 
Powell, the 5–4 swing vote, wrote a separate concurrence “to emphasize . . . the 
limited nature of the Court’s holding.”426 Justice Powell seized upon language near 
the end of Justice White’s majority opinion427 suggesting that First Amendment 
protection for reporters would arise if it appeared that the grand jury investigation 
                                                          
416 Id. at 668. 
417 Id. at 678. 
418 Id. at 708. 
419 Id. at 682. 
420 Id. at 691. 
421 Id. at 692. 
422 Id. at 704; First Nat’l Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 801 (1978) (Burger,  
C.J., concurring). 
423 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704–05. 
424 Id. at 725–30 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
425 Id. at 725. 
426 Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). 
427 Id. at 708–09 (majority opinion). 
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were not being conducted in good faith.428 Due to Justice Powell’s opinion, there 
now exists a circuit split over how to interpret Branzburg. Some Second Circuit 
cases recognize that reporters enjoy a qualified privilege regarding compelled 
disclosure of their confidential sources—a privilege that survived the 5-4 
Branzburg decision due to Justice Powell’s concurrence.429 The D.C. Circuit flatly 
rejects this proposition.430 
Under Justice White’s opinion in Branzburg, reporters are just as vulnerable 
as other citizens to grand jury subpoenas; under Zurcher, reporters are just as 
vulnerable to search warrants. 
Zurcher upheld the newsroom search of a college paper’s editorial offices, 
holding that so long as the search satisfies the Fourth Amendment, the First 
Amendment affords the news media no special protection from search and 
seizure.431 In Zurcher, a student newspaper published articles and photographs 
concerning a violent clash on campus between demonstrators and police.432 
Seeking negatives and photos that might help them identify those demonstrators, 
police obtained a search warrant and then conducted a surprise raid on the paper’s 
editorial offices, where they rifled filing cabinets, desks, wastepaper baskets, and 
photographic laboratories.433 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice White, 
rejected proposed restrictions on governmental searches of newsrooms—
restrictions that would have limited the police to using a subpoena duces tecum 
rather than a search warrant.434 Under this arrangement, the editorial staff—not the 
police—would perform the task of combing through the files. Justice White held 
that the First Amendment does nothing to diminish the government’s power to 
search newsrooms, so long as those searches are conducted in strict accordance 
with the Fourth Amendment.435 
In dissent, Justice Stewart emphasized the stark contrast between a subpoena 
and a search warrant in extracting evidence from a newsroom: 
 
A search warrant allows police officers to ransack the files of a 
newspaper, reading each and every document until they have found the 
one named in the warrant, while a subpoena would permit the newspaper 
itself to produce only the specific documents requested. A search, unlike 
a subpoena, will therefore lead to the needless exposure of confidential 
information completely unrelated to the purpose of the investigation. The 
knowledge that police officers can make an unannounced raid on a 
newsroom is thus bound to have a deterrent effect on the availability of 
                                                          
428 Id. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring). 
429 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 172–73 (2d Cir. 2006). 
430 In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 397 F.3d 964, 970 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
431 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978). 
432 Id. at 550–51. 
433 Id. at 551. 
434 Id. at 563–66. 
435 Id. at 565. 
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confidential news sources. The end result, wholly inimical to the First 
Amendment, will be a diminishing flow of potentially important 
information to the public.436 
 
Taken together, Branzburg and Zurcher leave the press vulnerable to 
government invasion of a reporter’s communications with confidential news 
sources. In both of these cases, the government squeezed the press for information, 
and yet a majority of the Justices found no role for the Press Clause to play. 
In contrast to Branzburg and Zurcher, Pell v. Procunier437 did not deal with 
governmental efforts to extract information from the press; instead, it questioned 
whether the government must treat the press more favorably than the general 
public in affording access to information in the government’s possession. Once 
again, the Court’s majority showed scant enthusiasm for breathing life into the 
Press Clause, but here Potter Stewart, normally a stalwart supporter of the press, 
authored the majority opinion.438 
In Pell, the Supreme Court rejected a Press Clause challenge to a California 
penal provision that barred face-to-face interviews between a reporter and any 
individual inmate whom the reporter specifically named and requested. Writing for 
the majority, Justice Stewart rejected the notion “that the Constitution imposes 
upon government the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of 
information not available to members of the public generally.”439 “That 
proposition,” he wrote, “finds no support in the words of the Constitution or in any 
decision of this Court.”440 Propounding what has since become a well-established 
limitation on press freedom, Justice Stewart observed: 
 
It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee 
the press a constitutional right of special access to information not 
available to the public generally. . . . Despite the fact that news gathering 
may be hampered, the press is regularly excluded from grand jury 
proceedings, [the Supreme Court’s] own conferences, the meetings of 
other official bodies gathering in executive session, and the meetings of 
private organizations. Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to 
the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is excluded. . . . 
Similarly, newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or 
their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.441 
 
                                                          
436 Id. at 573 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
437 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (upholding a California penal provision that barred face-to-
face interviews between a reporter and any individual inmate whom the reporter 
specifically named and requested). 
438 Id. at 819. 
439 Id. at 834. 
440 Id. at 834–35. 
441 Id. at 833–34 (citations omitted). 
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Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, wrote an eloquent 
dissent that offers valuable insight into the nature of the Press Clause. He asserted 
that the principle adopted by the majority—restricting press access to the same low 
level as public access—ignores the fact that the press represents the public, that it 
ventures into prisons so that the public won’t have to: “The average citizen is most 
unlikely to inform himself about the operation of the prison system by requesting 
an interview with a particular inmate with whom he has no prior relationship. He is 
likely instead, in a society which values a free press, to rely upon the [news] media 
for information.”442 Restricting press access to public access makes no sense under 
a Constitution that “specifically selected [the press] to play an important role in the 
discussion of public affairs.”443 The majority’s analysis was flawed, suggested 
Justice Douglas, because it failed to bear in mind the true focus of the Press 
Clause—to fulfill the public’s right to know: 
 
In dealing with the free press guarantee, it is important to note that the 
interest it protects is not possessed by the media themselves. [When the 
district court judge struck down the regulation below, he] did not 
vindicate any right of the Washington Post, but rather the right of the 
people, the true sovereign under our constitutional scheme, to govern in 
an informed manner. The press has a preferred position in our 
constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set 
newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the public’s 
right to know. The right to know is crucial to the governing powers of 
the people.444 
 
Six years later, in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,445 the Court paid lip 
service to this public “right to know”—but not as a basis for breathing life into the 
Press Clause, and not as a basis for abandoning its linkage of press access to public 
access. In Richmond Newspapers, the Court recognized a general right of public 
and press access to criminal trials.446 But this right is not a special Press Clause 
right enjoyed by the news media; it is a general First Amendment right of public 
access. Invoking the Speech, Press, Assembly, and Petition Clauses of the First 
Amendment, the Court asserted that “[t]hese expressly guaranteed freedoms share 
a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating 
to the functioning of government.”447 Thus, the First Amendment confers upon the 
public a broad right to know about governmental proceedings: 
 
                                                          
442 Id. at 841 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
443 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S 214, 219 (1966)). 
444 Id. at 839–40 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
445 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (holding that “the right to attend criminal trials is 
implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment”). 
446 Id. at 580. 
447 Id. at 575 (emphasis added). 
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[T]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-
expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock 
of information from which members of the public may draw. Free speech 
carries with it some freedom to listen. In a variety of contexts, this  
Court has referred to a First Amendment right to receive information  
and ideas.448 
 
Based, then, on this broad right to know, the Court has issued a series of 
decisions guaranteeing public access to criminal proceedings: striking down 
restrictions on public access to rape trials,449 guaranteeing public access to voir dire 
examinations in criminal proceedings,450 and recognizing a qualified First 
Amendment right of public access to preliminary hearings in criminal trials as 
conducted in California.451 
Ultimately, though, the press enjoys only that degree of access enjoyed by the 
public generally—and such access is by no means derived specifically from  
the Press Clause. It is derived instead from the public’s right to know—a  
right that emanates from the Speech, Press, Assembly, and Petition Clauses  
in combination.452 
 
VII. RECONCILING MODERN PRESS CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE WITH HISTORY 
 
Looking back at this tour through the case law, what are we to make of the 
Press Clause? As the Supreme Court has construed it, the Press Clause is almost 
void of independent content. The press enjoys no greater right of access to 
government information or proceedings than the general public, reporters are just 
as vulnerable to search warrants and grand jury subpoenas as their fellow citizens, 
and the press enjoys no special power or privilege to gather information. Thanks to 
the Speech Clause, the press enjoys extraordinary protection from censorship and 
prior restraint, but the Press Clause appears bereft of independent significance. 
Conspicuously absent from Press Clause jurisprudence is any sustained 
emphasis on history. This may best explain how the Press Clause came to play 
such an insignificant role in constitutional law. Viewed through the lens of history 
                                                          
448 Id. at 575–76 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
449 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
450 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
451 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986). In 
deciding whether the First Amendment confers a right of public access to certain 
governmental proceedings, the Supreme Court has examined “two complementary 
considerations”: (1) whether the proceedings “have historically been open to the press and 
general public,” and (2) “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the 
functioning of the particular process in question.” Id. at 8. If, based on this analysis, the 
public does enjoy a right of access, any governmental restriction on such access will be 
gauged under strict scrutiny. Id. 
452 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575. 
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(as this Article has shown), the Press Clause was certainly not regarded as an 
empty reiteration of the Speech Clause. With the Roberts Court displaying a 
heightened interest in history (as discussed below453), perhaps there is hope for a 
fresh interpretation of the Press Clause. But first, let’s consider an early prior 
restraint case where the Supreme Court specifically examined “the conception of 
the liberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed.”454 
In Near v. Minnesota,455 the Supreme Court struck down an injunction that 
perpetually enjoined the Saturday Press from publishing any “malicious, 
scandalous, or defamatory” material.456 The paper had been sharply critical of the 
Minneapolis police chief for allowing “a Jewish gangster” to control all “gambling, 
bootlegging, and racketeering” in the city.457 The paper accused the police chief of 
“gross neglect of duty, illicit relations with gangsters, and . . . participation in 
graft.”458 In this early decision, handed down in 1931, the Supreme Court was not 
yet speaking interchangeably of Speech and Press, and was not yet treating the 
Press Clause as merely synonymous with the Speech Clause. Instead, the Court 
referred consistently to the “liberty of the press” and the “freedom of the press.”459 
For our purposes, the majority opinion (authored by Chief Justice Charles 
Evans Hughes) has two significant features. First, the Court consulted a wide 
number of eighteenth-century sources—ranging from Blackstone and De Lolme on 
English law, to James Madison on the early state constitutions, to the journal of the 
Continental Congress460—all in an effort to grasp the early historical conception of 
press freedom. Second, in marshaling these authorities, the Court singled out the 
principal value of press freedom: the role of the press as government watchdog, 
exposing official misconduct to public view.461 By monitoring the actions of public 
officials, the press performs so valuable a service that its immunity from prior 
restraint should be preserved even at the risk that such immunity might be abused: 
 
The importance of this immunity has not lessened. While reckless 
assaults upon public men, and efforts to bring obloquy upon those who 
are endeavoring faithfully to discharge official duties, exert a baleful 
influence and deserve the severest condemnation in public opinion, it 
cannot be said that this abuse is greater, and it is believed to be less, than 
that which characterized the period in which our institutions took shape. 
                                                          
453 See infra notes 474–475 and accompanying text. 
454 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (emphasis added). 
455 Id. 
456 Id. at 706. 
457 Id. at 704. 
458 Id. 
459 See id. at 716–17 (emphases added). 
460 Id. at 713–18. 
461 Id. at 716–17 (“The conception of the liberty of the press in this country . . . was 
especially cherished for the immunity it afforded from previous restraint of the publication 
of censure of public officers and charges of official misconduct.”). 
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Meanwhile, the administration of government has become more 
complex, the opportunities for malfeasance and corruption have 
multiplied, crime has grown to most serious proportions, and the danger 
of its protection by unfaithful officials and of the impairment of the 
fundamental security of life and property by criminal alliances and 
official neglect, emphasizes the primary need of a vigilant and 
courageous press, especially in great cities. The fact that the liberty of the 
press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make 
any the less necessary the immunity of the press from previous restraint 
in dealing with official misconduct.462 
 
In the years since Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court has lapsed into 
treating the Speech Clause as the prime guarantor of press freedom, losing sight of 
the Press Clause’s distinct history. But from time to time, the modern Court has 
consulted history when construing other clauses of the First Amendment. 
In 1995, invoking the Speech Clause to strike down a ban on anonymous 
political leafleting,463 the Court examined both literary and American 
Revolutionary history. Writing for a 7–2 majority, Justice Stevens surveyed the 
broad range of literary and political authors who chose to publish anonymously or 
under pseudonyms—including Mark Twain, Voltaire, George Sand, George Eliot, 
Charles Dickens, and, during the period surrounding the American Revolution and 
Founding, “Publius,” “Junius,” “Cato,” “Centinel,” and “The Federal Farmer.”464 
In a separate concurrence, Justice Thomas delved even more deeply into the 
revolutionary and ratification periods, examining the historical evidence at 
length465 and concluding that “the Framers relied upon anonymity” to a 
“remarkable extent” in the newspapers and pamphlets of that era.466 
In 1992467 and 1995,468 the Court devoted considerable attention to the 
historical origins of the Establishment Clause, with Justice Souter469 and Justice 
                                                          
462 Id. at 719–20. 
463 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (“Under our 
Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an 
honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of 
the majority. It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First 
Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—and their ideas 
from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.” (citation omitted)). 
464 Id. at 341–43. 
465 Id. at 360–70 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
466 Id. at 367. 
467 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down a policy that authorized 
prayer at public school graduation ceremonies). 
468 Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that a student religious 
journal was entitled to the same subsidy from student activity funds that the university 
furnished to secular student journals). 
469 Lee, 505 U.S. at 612–31 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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Scalia470 painting conflicting visions of Founding era sentiments, and Justice 
Souter471 and Justice Thomas472 squaring off in a duel over the correct 
interpretation of James Madison’s famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against 
Religious Assessments.473 
More recently, the Roberts Court has shown a genuine willingness to be 
guided by early American history when interpreting the Constitution. In two recent 
First Amendment cases—United States v. Stevens474 and Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Association475—the Court refused to recognize new categories of 
unprotected speech absent a longstanding historical tradition of treating the speech 
as unprotected. 
In Stevens the Court struck down, as substantially overbroad, a federal statute 
that criminalized depictions of animal cruelty. In the process, the Court rejected the 
government’s invitation to hold that depictions of animal cruelty are categorically 
unprotected by the First Amendment, and the Court stressed that it is disinclined to 
recognize new categories of unprotected speech.476 The government proposed a 
test for recognizing new categories of unprotected speech—“[w]hether a given 
category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection depends upon a categorical 
balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs”477—that prompted 
the following reaction from Chief Justice Roberts, writing for an 8–1 majority: 
 
As a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage, that sentence is 
startling and dangerous. The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech 
does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc 
balancing of relative social costs and benefits. The First Amendment 
itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its 
restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution 
                                                          
470 Id. at 631–42 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
471 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 868–72 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
472 Id. at 854–59 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
473 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 8 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298–304 (William T. Hutchinson ed., Chi. & London, 
Univ. of Chi. Press 1973) (1785), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 82, 82–84 
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
474 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (striking down, as substantially overbroad, a federal statute 
that criminalized depictions of animal cruelty). The challenged statute—18 U.S.C. § 48—
was aimed primarily at the interstate market for “crush videos,” which depict women 
slowly crushing small animals like mice or hamsters to death “‘with their bare feet or while 
wearing high heeled shoes,’ sometimes while ‘talking to the animals in a kind of 
dominatrix patter.’” Id. at 1583 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 106-397 at 2–3 (1999)). 
475 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (holding that video games qualify for First Amendment 
protection, and invoking strict scrutiny to strike down a California law that banned the sale 
or rental of violent video games to minors). 
476 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586. 
477 Id. at 1585 (internal quotations omitted). 
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forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that 
some speech is not worth it.478 
 
The Chief Justice went on to suggest that speech will be deemed categorically 
unprotected only if it has so been treated by longstanding historical tradition: 
 
Our decisions . . . cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling 
authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the 
First Amendment. Maybe there are some categories of speech that have 
been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically 
identified or discussed as such in our case law. But if so, there is no 
evidence that “depictions of animal cruelty” is among them. We need not 
foreclose the future recognition of such additional categories to reject the 
Government’s highly manipulable balancing test as a means of 
identifying them.479 
 
In Brown, the Court reasserted its reluctance to recognize new categories of 
unprotected speech, invoking strict scrutiny to strike down a California law that 
banned the sale or rental of “violent video games” to minors. Writing for a 7–2 
majority, Justice Scalia rejected as “unprecedented and mistaken” California’s 
effort “to create a wholly new category of content-based regulation that is 
permissible only for speech directed at children.”480 States certainly possess 
“legitimate power to protect children from harm,” he wrote, “but that does not 
include a free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be 
exposed.”481 Justice Scalia asserted that the holding in Stevens “controls this case,” 
because in both cases the government sought to justify categorical restrictions on 
violent speech by analogizing that speech to obscenity.482 He stressed that the 
Court will be unwilling to recognize any new categories of unprotected speech 
“without persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if 
heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription.”483 
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480 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735. 
481 Id. at 2736. 
482 Id. at 2734. 
483 Id. (emphasis added). Justice Scalia concluded that the California statute, as a 
content-based restriction on protected speech, must be analyzed under strict scrutiny. Id. at 
2738. Justice Alito, in a separate concurrence joined by Chief Justice Roberts, disagreed 
with the broad sweep of the majority’s holding and argued that the statute should have been 
struck down on the narrower ground of vagueness. But he wrote separately for another 
reason—to stress the extraordinary realism and power of video games, suggesting that a 
child’s experience in playing them is far more vivid and visceral than reading a book, so 
the Court should proceed cautiously in affording unqualified protection to this new medium 
of expression. Justice Alito then recounted the “astounding” violence to be encountered in 
some video games: 
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In Stevens and Brown, the Roberts Court relied upon historical tradition in 
rejecting the creation of new Speech Clause doctrines; but the Roberts Court has 
also used history as a guide in reinterpreting the Constitution. Crawford v. 
Washington484 exemplifies the Court’s willingness to take a long, thoughtful look 
at eighteenth-, seventeenth-, and sixteenth-century history in tearing down and 
rebuilding its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence under the Sixth Amendment. 
Crawford addresses the conflict between a criminal defendant’s confrontation 
rights and the admissibility against him of hearsay statements by nontestifying 
witnesses. In Crawford, the Supreme Court overruled a twenty-four-year-old 
precedent,485 replacing it with a new analytical approach that Justice Scalia, writing 
for the Court, grounded upon the Framers’ original understanding of the 
Confrontation Clause. 
Performing an extensive historical review of English and American colonial 
practices leading up to the adoption in 1791 of the Sixth Amendment, Justice 
Scalia concluded, “[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of 
ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”486 
                                                          
Victims are dismembered, decapitated, disemboweled, set on fire, and 
chopped into little pieces. . . . There are games in which the player can take on 
the identity and reenact the killings carried out by the perpetrators of the 
murders at Columbine High School and Virginia Tech. The objective of one 
game is to rape a mother and her daughters; in another, the goal is to rape Native 
American women. There is a game in which players engage in ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
and can choose to gun down African-Americans, Latinos, or Jews. 
 
Id. at 2749–50 (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Scalia readily agreed that 
these illustrations were disgusting—“but disgust is not a valid basis for restricting 
expression.” Id. at 2738. 
484 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
485 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36. 
486 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. Carefully examining the English common law 
experience in the centuries leading up to the Revolutionary and Founding eras, Justice 
Scalia wrote, “English common law has long differed from continental civil law in regard 
to the manner in which witnesses give testimony in criminal trials. The common-law 
tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing, while the civil law 
condones examination in private by judicial officers.” Id. at 43 (citing 3 BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES, 373–74 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1768)). “Nonetheless,” he continued, 
 
England at times adopted elements of the civil law practice. Justices of the peace 
or other officials examined suspects and witnesses before trial. These 
examinations were sometimes read in court in lieu of live testimony, a practice 
that “occasioned frequent demands by the prisoner to have his ‘accusers,’ i.e. the 
witnesses against him, brought before him face to face.” 
 
Id. (quoting 1 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 326 (London, MacMillan & Co.1883)). 
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“The most notorious instances of civil-law examination,” he observed, 
“occurred in the great political trials of the 16th and 17th centuries.”487 Here, 
Justice Scalia singled out the infamous treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 
1603.488 Raleigh was convicted and sentenced to death largely on the basis of out-
of-court statements by his alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham, who never appeared 
or testified at Raleigh’s trial.489 Cobham’s statements, which shifted the blame to 
Raleigh, were made in a letter and in an examination before the King’s Privy 
Council. They were read to the jury over Raleigh’s objection: “The Proof of the 
Common Law is by witness and jury; let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call 
my accuser before my face . . . .”490 
It was in reaction to abuses like this that the Framers adopted the 
Confrontation Clause. As Justice Scalia explained, 
 
The historical record [demonstrates] . . . that the Framers would not have 
allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not 
appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had 
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. . . . [T]he common law in 
1791 conditioned admissibility of an absent witness’s examination on 
unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine. The Sixth 
Amendment therefore incorporates those limitations.491 
 
If the Roberts Court found it acceptable to reinvent its Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence in accordance with the unique history of the Confrontation Clause, it 
might be willing to do the same for the Press Clause. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION—REINVIGORATING THE PRESS CLAUSE 
 
If the Supreme Court were to reinterpret the Press Clause in accordance with 
the historical findings set forth in this Article, what would be the result? As 
explained more fully below, the Court would alter current Press Clause 
jurisprudence in three significant respects. First, the difficulty of defining the 
institutional press would be alleviated: the definition would focus on 
newsgathering organizations that investigate and report on the activities of 
government. Second, the leading Press Clause precedents outlined above—
particularly Branzburg, Zurcher, and Pell—would be overruled as wrongly 
                                                          
487 Id. at 44. 
488 R v. Sir Walter Raleigh, (1603) 2 Cobbett’s State Trials 1, 15–16, 24 (K.B.) 
489 Id. 
490 Id. at 15–16. 
491 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54. Thus, the Court held that out-of-court statements by 
a witness that are testimonial are barred, under the Confrontation Clause, unless the witness 
is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine that witness, 
regardless of whether such statements are deemed reliable by the court. Id. at 61. 
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decided. Third, a new doctrine—recognizing greater press access to newsworthy 
events and information under government control—would have to be developed. 
In Bellotti, Chief Justice Burger cited the difficulty of defining the 
institutional press as a key reason for rejecting any special Press Clause protection 
for the news media.492 But the difficulty of defining the press is no reason for 
treating the Press Clause as an empty promise. Defining the institutional press 
becomes easier if we are guided by the historical findings sketched above, in which 
newspapers were valued primarily for their role as government watchdogs, 
gathering and disseminating information about the conduct of public officials. This 
theme accords with Justice Stewart’s conception of the press as the “Fourth 
Estate,” providing “organized, expert scrutiny” of public officials,493 and it is a 
theme that continues even now to define the role of the press. Envisioning a role 
for the institutional press in the twenty-first century, Lee C. Bollinger observes: 
 
[A]s long as there is democracy or government based on some even 
minimal level of consent of the people, the press is a necessity. Someone 
must provide us with factual information and analysis of what is 
happening in the world while upholding values of—in the language of 
the Pulitzer Prize—“honesty, accuracy, and fairness.”494 
 
And Bollinger adds that the institutional press must include “organizations large 
and powerful enough to be able effectively to monitor and check the authority of 
the state.”495 When defining the institutional press, these two functions—
newsgathering and government monitoring—must reside at the center of  
any definition. 
What does this mean for bloggers and other opinion writers? Don’t they more 
closely resemble the printers and pamphleteers of the Revolutionary era than a 
modern media giant like the New York Times? In many respects, yes, but news 
analysis and editorial opinion bear the stamp of individual expression that is more 
readily associated with the Speech Clause. A revitalized Press Clause would afford 
protections—like increased access to newsworthy events and information, and 
immunity from newsroom searches and grand jury subpoenas—more pertinent to 
an investigative, fact-gathering organization. 
This leads to our second point: if the Press Clause were reinterpreted in 
accordance with the historical findings outlined in this Article, then Branzburg,496 
                                                          
492 435 U.S. 765, 801–02 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
493 Stewart, supra note 23, at 634. 
494 BOLLINGER, supra note 410, at 109. 
495 Id. 
496 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690–91 (1972) (rejecting the notion that the 
Press Clause affords reporters any greater protection from grand jury subpoenas than  
other citizens). 
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Zurcher,497 and Pell498 would be overruled. Branzburg and Zurcher are wrongly 
decided under the historical interpretation of the Press Clause because, as a 
government watchdog with a structural role499 to play in the separation of powers, 
the institutional press must be protected from government “ransack[ing]”500 of 
newsrooms (through search warrants) and government-compelled disclosure of 
confidential sources and information (through grand jury subpoenas). 
Pell is wrongly decided for limiting press access to the same low level as 
public access vis-à-vis government-controlled information and events. As Justice 
Douglas explained,501 this linkage completely misunderstands the institutional role 
of the press as representing the public, venturing into prisons and other 
government institutions on the public’s behalf. Because the role of the press is to 
keep the public informed, individual members of the public will not likely 
undertake their own investigations of the prison system or other government 
institutions. So it makes no sense, under the Press Clause, to define press access in 
terms of public access. Though Richmond Newspapers502 and its progeny have 
afforded meaningful press access to criminal trials, they bear the same fundamental 
flaw as Pell, linking press access to public access. By rejecting an independent, 
affirmative right of press access, the Supreme Court has given the press an 
unseemly incentive to encourage unlawful leaks of secret information by 
government employees.503 
Finally, a reinterpreted Press Clause would reject the linkage between press 
and public access, and would instead recognize greater press access to newsworthy 
events and information under government control. Contemplating a twenty-first-
century role for the institutional press, Lee C. Bollinger has called504 for such  
a doctrine: 
 
                                                          
497 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978) (rejecting the notion that the 
Press Clause affords the news media any greater protection from search and seizure than 
other citizens). 
498 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833–34 (1974) (rejecting the notion that the Press 
Clause affords journalists any greater right of access to prisons than that enjoyed by the 
public generally). 
499 See Stewart, supra note 23, at 633. 
500 Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 573 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
501 Pell, 417 U.S. at 841 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
502 Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577–78 (1980) (recognizing a 
general right of public and press access to criminal trials, but treating press access as 
dependent upon public access). 
503 BOLLINGER, supra note 410, at 122. “Under the current state of the law,” writes 
Bollinger, “the press has an incentive to encourage leaks so that it and the public can reap 
the benefits of publication, while the leaker is left to face possible prosecution and 
punishment.” Id. at 123. 
504 Bollinger calls specifically for “a Doctrine of Access to Newsworthy Events and 
Information.” Id. at 124. 
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When a new case comes along involving the public interest in 
knowing about information under the government’s control, the 
[Supreme] Court should take the next step and announce a general right 
of access. A good example that could have been used this way was the 
dispute between the government and the press over access to the war 
zone in Afghanistan. Another example was the request by the press to 
visit military prisons in Iraq.505 
 
Bollinger acknowledges the likely criticism of such a doctrine—that press 
demands will overwhelm the courts and overburden the government—but “[w]e 
can take comfort,” he says, “from the fact that we have successfully managed 
exactly this state of affairs under the freedom of information acts that have existed 
now for several decades.”506 And he sees an existing First Amendment doctrine 
that can serve as a model: 
 
The Court has often recognized a First Amendment right in situations 
that seem to open up endless problems of definition. The Public Forum 
Doctrine is a good analogy. The Public Forum Doctrine exemplifies how 
the Court has developed an affirmative duty under the First Amendment 
requiring the government to help expand the opportunities for speech. 
This doctrine compels the government to allow speech to take place on 
some public property, such as streets, parks, and sidewalks. The Public 
Forum Doctrine is a precedent for protections on the newsgathering side 
of freedom of the press.507 
 
Though Bollinger proposes this doctrine while envisioning a future role for 
the institutional press, the doctrine’s adoption will depend on the Supreme Court’s 
willingness to be guided by the past—specifically, by the unique history of the 
Press Clause revealed in this Article. 
                                                          
505 Id. at 124–25. 
506 Id. at 123. 
507 Id. at 123–24 (citation omitted). 
